

1986

The evolution of containment and its effect on the Indian subcontinent (1947-1965).

Neil. Saigal

University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd>

Recommended Citation

Saigal, Neil., "The evolution of containment and its effect on the Indian subcontinent (1947-1965)." (1986). *Electronic Theses and Dissertations*. Paper 3983.

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters' theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208.



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Services des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

CANADIAN THESES

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.

THIS DISSERTATION
HAS BEEN MICROFILMED
EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

THÈSES CANADIENNES

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE
NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR

THE EVOLUTION OF CONTAINMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON
THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

(1947-1965)

BY

© NEIL SAIGAL

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

WINDSOR, ONTARIO

DECEMBER, 1982

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.)

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-29318-7

© Neil Saigal 1982

852331

For My Family

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my deep appreciation to my professors at the University of Windsor whose suggestions, comments, and criticism have helped me in this pleasant undertaking. Special gratitude is expressed to Professors Ian Pemberton and Udo Sautter for never failing to encourage me in my various courses and in this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
1 THE EVOLUTION OF CONTAINMENT (1947-1949)	1
2 CONTAINMENT AND THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT (1947-1952)	32
3 CONTAINMENT AND PACTOMANIA ON THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT (1953-1965)	75
4 CONCLUSION	113
BIBLIOGRAPHY	121

CHAPTER 1

THE EVOLUTION OF CONTAINMENT 1947-1949

With the end of the Second World War, both the United States and the Soviet Union set out to restore world order according to their needs. While the decision makers of both nations were busy with the job of restoring some kind of order in war-torn Europe, a State Department official with considerable knowledge in Soviet affairs was busy putting down his ideas for his country's post-war policy.

In an article entitled "The Source of Soviet Conduct" which appeared in Foreign Affairs (July, 1947), he publicly presented the policy of containment for the first time. The anonymous author of this article, written in 1946 and published a year later, was George F. Kennan. This famous essay was not an official statement of American foreign policy, but rather an academic endeavour to describe the realities of then-existing Soviet-American relations, with a personal suggestion of how the United States could meet the situation. In this article Kennan argued that

the main element of American policy "must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."¹

Thus Kennan argued that:

the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western World is something that can be contained by adroit and vigilant applications of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy.²

In essence what Kennan meant was that the Soviet Union was a state under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purpose in a hurry. This purpose, he argued, was nothing short of world revolution. In other words the Soviet Union, we are to believe, is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and therefore she can afford to wait. The Soviet "concept" and its consequences mean that "we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with."³ In this "difficult" relation-

¹ George F. Kennan, "The Source of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs, xxv, No. 4, (July 1947), 575-576.

² Kennan, "The Source of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs (July, 1947), 576.

³ Kennan, "The Source of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs (July, 1947), 576.

ship Kennan perceived there would be many opportunities presented which could be exploited. Police supervision, forced industrialization, and the toll of the war had left the Soviet people tired, disillusioned, and skeptical about the goals of the communist state. The monolithic authority of the state was only a thin crust over the amorphous mass of the Russian people, and it was perceived by Kennan that a serious break in this crust would produce chaos.⁴

Thus, Kennan's thesis which was to become so vital a factor in American diplomacy could be briefly cited:

the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia.⁵

What Kennan was saying is that Russian communism is not merely a form of government but a pseudoreligion

⁴ Kennan, "The Source of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs (July, 1947), 569.

⁵ Kennan, "The Source of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs (July, 1947), 578.

with fixed dogmas and an unalterable mission to destroy the nonbelievers. It is an ideological force without national or racial boundaries, impelled by its very nature to fall into any political crevice from which it is not forcibly excluded. It can not be destroyed where it has taken root, nor can it for long be appeased, but its spread can be checked. It can be "contained" within the boundaries it already inhabits.

Consequently, Kennan argued that effective containment by counteraction at every point at which there were signs of encroachment on the interests of a peaceful and stable world would have a long-term frustrating effect on the Soviet state, which in turn would work on the points of weakness in the Soviet system. The hope of its adherents would wane. Finally, strains within the Soviet Union would increase, and it would be forced to adjust in one way or another, to the new state of affairs. As this process continued, the United States could look forward to the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.⁶

6

Kennan, "The Source of Soviet Conduct" in Foreign Affairs (July, 1947), 582.

Meanwhile, the American decision-makers had realized that Franklin Roosevelt's dreams for a post-war entente were not to be realized and that a tougher line toward the Soviet Union was in order. The basis for this view was not hard to find, for in 1946 Moscow showed clear evidence of expansionist tendencies in Manchuria, Iran, Greece, and Turkey. In his memoirs President Truman wrote that:

In spite of these efforts (formation of the UN and the Potsdam agreements) relations with Russia had become strained. Victory had turned a difficult ally in war into an even more troublesome peace-time partner. Russia seemed bent upon taking advantage of war-shattered neighbors for imperialistic ends.⁷

In the same volume of his memoirs, Truman outlined his feelings towards the Soviets:

In our dealings with the Russians we had learned that we had to lead from strength and that any show of weakness was fatal. But there was never the suggestion of belligerency in our attitude. We made every effort to talk reason and cooperation with them,

⁷
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Hope,
Vol. II (Washington, 1959), 2.

and we meant it. But for reasons best known to them they either could not, or would not, believe us.⁸

This attitude was quickly transformed into reality when, after two years of uncertainty and hesitation, the United States began to hammer out the policies--subsumed under the general heading of containment--which laid the foundation for post-war diplomacy.

The first of these, the Truman Doctrine, was hastily assembled in an atmosphere of crisis in the spring of 1947. When General George Marshall took office as Secretary of State on January 21, 1947, his first major task was to prepare for the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on Germany. The Italian and the Balkan peace treaties having been signed, Germany remained the great unsettled problem in Europe, the central point of conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. However, events did not await the conclusion of the deliberations on Germany. The gathering crisis with which Secretary

8

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, 2.

Marshall had to contend broke first in Greece and then in Western Europe.

Behind this crisis were two unrelenting pressures: one political--exercised by the Soviet bloc on non-soviet Europe through penetration by territorial expansion for their future security; the other economic--poverty, hunger and shortage of critical materials affecting Eastern and Western Europe alike.⁹ The United States had given indications of its intentions to stay in Europe, to keep its troops in Germany and its seat at the conference table until the conclusion of a peace settlement, and of its willingness to enter into a long-term commitment to keep Germany disarmed. The United States had also borne the greater part of the burden of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) program which was coming to an end with the earlier American loans being rapidly used up, and recovery still far from attained.

The danger was the greatest in Greece. Beginning in 1944 when the German forces evacuated Greece,

9

John C. Campbell and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs 1947-48 (New York, 1948), 53.

the British government had been aiding a right-wing government against a spectrum of opponents--moderates, liberals, and communists. The British troops supported the government against various guerrilla bands, and British funding kept it in power. The Greek government used totalitarian tactics--arrests, intimidation, suppression of free speech, execution. In essence, the struggle for survival was brutal.

Naturally, the government and the communists had sought outside support and for that purpose identified what was primarily a civil war with the developing struggle between the Soviet Union and the West. The freedom of mankind was being threatened by communist aggression in Greece, argued the Greek government. The communists argued that the gangsters of Athens were the heirs of Hitler and the tools of British imperialism.¹⁰

The American government, meanwhile, was indeed aware of the fact that the Greek regime hardly represented the highest ideals of humanity, democracy, and liberalism, but the American decision-makers rationalized by arguing that at least the regime was not communist.

Thus, when Great Britain gave notice of her inability to bear any longer the financial burden of helping Greece, Washington's reaction was immediate and unexpectedly strong. The dispatch of economic aid, military supplies and a military-naval mission constituted the essentials of the "Truman Doctrine", which President Harry Truman proposed on March 12, 1947. The specific measures concerned Greece and Turkey, whereas the language of the President's message to the Congress was universal in scope. The problem of Greece was thus depicted by Truman as the problem of the world; the fundamental imperatives were the same everywhere although local circumstances might differ.

On March 12, Truman laid the cornerstone of post-World War Two American foreign policy which officially brought America out of isolation during peacetime and into the limelight of World affairs. In his message to the Congress, Truman declared:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.¹¹

.....
The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.¹²

In one stroke of genius, Truman had bypassed the United Nations and announced a unilateral approach to matters considered important to United States interests. He had also proclaimed the first step in the now-familiar containment thesis against radicalism in general and communism in particular. Finally, he suggested the domino theory, though not specifically by that name later made famous by the Eisenhower administration in relation to southeast Asia, but rather by the argument that if Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect on its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. In Truman's own words:

¹¹

Public Papers of the President's, Harry S. Truman, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the Presidents. January 1 to December 31, 1947 (Washington, 1963), 178-179.

¹²

Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 180.

the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose people are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedom and independence while they repair the damage of war.¹³

One must understand that it was not just an abstract fidelity to freedom which governed the American decision to extend its power and influence abroad, but rather that the definition of American domestic security had changed. It was now enlarged to the World arena rather than just the Western Hemisphere, a position whose historic cornerstone had been the Monroe Doctrine.

The most severe criticism of the Truman doctrine was its apparent universalism, its promise that the United States "must approach each situation as it occurs, in the light of the facts of the situation."¹⁴ To voice this opinion as Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson did was one thing, whereas to follow it in the future was another. Nevertheless, after debating Truman's request for aid to Greece and Turkey, the Con-

¹³
Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 179.

¹⁴
Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 180.

gress did acquiesce. On May 22, the President signed the Greek-Turkish aid bill. While the "Truman Doctrine" was getting official blessings, the State Department was deeply involved in the preliminaries of the most important program of the Truman years--the Marshall Plan.

The Marshall Plan or the European Recovery Program announced just four months after the promulgation of the Truman doctrine, was sold to the American public largely as a compound of humanitarian largesse and enlightened economic statesmanship, the latter proceeding from the premise that an economically healthy Europe was a precondition for the World trade required by an expanding United States economy. Thus it was a conscious policy decision to underplay the global balance of power considerations which were very much a part of the impetus behind the Marshall plan.

In a then-secret memorandum, George Kennan and the policy planning staff recognized that "the Communist successes would create serious danger to American security."¹⁵ The policy planning staff ad-

15

Harry Bagard Price, The Marshall Plan and its Meaning (New York, 1955), 22.

vised Secretary Marshall that:

American effort in aid to Europe should be directed not to combatting of Communism as such but to the restoration of the health and vigor of European society. It should aim, in other words, not to combat communism, but the economic maladjustment which makes European society vulnerable to exploitation by any and all totalitarian movements and which Russian Communism is now exploiting.¹⁶

More significant perhaps was the brief separate section at the end of the memorandum advising that:

Steps should be taken to clarify what the press has unfortunately come to identify as the "Truman doctrine", and to remove in particular two damaging impressions which are current in large sections of American public opinion. These are:

a) That the U.S. approach to World problems is a defensive reaction to Communist pressure and that the effort to restore sound economic conditions in the other countries is only the by-product of this reaction and not something we should be interested in doing if there were no communist menace.

b) That the Truman Doctrine is a blank check to give economic and military aid to any area of the world where the communists show signs of being successful. It must be

made clear that the extension of American aid is essentially a question of political economy in the literal sense of the term and that such aid will be considered only in cases where the prospective results bear a satisfactory relationship to the expenditure of American resources and effort.¹⁷

This advice was accepted by the Secretary of State. Launching the program for European recovery at Cambridge, Massachusetts on June 5, 1947 Marshall claimed that "our policy is not against any country or any doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos."¹⁸ The offer to join in the cooperative effort was made to all European nations, although, there was considerable disagreement over this approach. Indeed many in the United States government and in Western Europe were relieved when Stalin prevented the East European states from joining the venture. But the offer to all European nations was made sincerely by Marshall and those like him in the State Department who had a multifaceted view of the relevant balance of

¹⁷

Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York, 1955), 251-252.

¹⁸

Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1947, 1159-1160.

power considerations: they felt that the revival of Western European economic vigor, which was based in large measure on manufacturing, would be facilitated by the raw material resources, that once again could be acquired from the East European areas. Eastern Europe in turn could provide a market for the West's manufactured goods. To maintain an advantageous balance of power against the Soviet Union, the West needed a strong Western Europe, but it did not require an unhealthy Eastern Europe.

Moreover, there were some in the United States government who felt that an eastern Europe largely dependent for its own well-being upon economic relations with the West would be less subject to total Soviet control. But such questions became academic when the Soviet Union advanced swiftly to transform the lands it had occupied into units of a tightly integrated economic system. Thus, any hope of gaining some influence in the Eastern European capitals was lost by a simple maneuver of political reality.

By the spring of 1948, the Truman administration set off with exemplary single mindedness to destroy

the Communist threat that existed in Western Europe. But the Communist answer to the Truman decisions of 1947 imposed enormous stress on the emerging containment policy.

On October 5, 1947 Pravda revealed that a conference in Poland of delegates from nine nations had created the Communist Information Bureau--a successor to the Communist International which had been dissolved in 1943.¹⁹

The Cominform's declaration, reaffirming the faith of the participating parties in Soviet leadership, called for the defeat of the Marshall Plan, "a European branch of the general world plan of political expansion being realized by the United States,"²⁰ and firmly divided the world into the United States, the Soviet Union and their respective allies. The World Communist Parties were to "place themselves in the vanguard of the opposition against the imperialistic plans of expansion."²¹

¹⁹ David Rees, The Age of Containment: The Cold War 1945-1965 (New York, 1968), 24.

²⁰ David Rees, The Age of Containment, 24.

²¹ David Rees, The Age of Containment, 24.

The formation of the Cominform was therefore a declaration of direct political warfare against the capitalist west but the Communist offensive was not confined to Europe only. In accordance with the classic Marxist-Leninist dictum²² that imperialism could be decisively weakened by detaching its colonial dependencies, armed uprisings were staged during 1948 by the Communist Parties in Asia, uprisings which were in all probability co-ordinated during the Communist-sponsored Southeast Asian Youth Conference at Calcutta in February of that year.²³

Serious as these Asian uprisings were at first throughout 1948-49, it was Europe which lay at the centre of the conflict. Czechoslovakia provided a clear-cut example. The Czech state had coexisted with the Soviet Union by simultaneously trying not to offend the latter and keeping its doors open to the west. This policy had started in late 1943 when Czech

²²The Marxist-Leninist dictum argues that capitalism cannot and does not want to remove the division between nations that are oppressive, exploitive and fully sovereign. This division exists and becomes "crystallized in the counterbalance of bourgeois democratic lies that throw a veil over characteristic epoch and financial enslavement of the predominant majority of the people of the world by a tiny number of the richest elements of the capitalist countries." V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. XXV, 286.

²³ Uprisings in Malaya, Philippines, Burma and Indonesia.

leaders signed a treaty with Stalin which obligated Czechoslovakia to become a part of the Soviet bloc.²⁴ President Eduard Benes and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk had thus far however successfully resisted complete Communist control. Stalin had not yet moved to consolidate his power by 1946 even after the Czech Communist Party emerged from the parliamentary elections with thirty-eight percent of the vote, the largest total of any party.²⁵ But by late 1947 the lure of Western aid began to show some effect. In the last half of 1947 only 15% of Czech trade was with the eastern bloc.²⁶ Slowly the Czech government was drifting away from the Soviets, and thus the Marshall plan was seen as a threat which would only encourage this process.

At this point, Stalin, who like Truman re-

24

John C. Campbell and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs, 1947-48 (New York, 1948), 488.

25

John C. Campbell and others, The United States in World Affairs, 1947-48, 488-489.

26

Campbell, The U.S. in World Affairs. 489.

called the pivotal role of Czechoslovakia in 1938, decided to put the 1943 treaty into effect. Klement Gottwald, the Czech Communist Party leader, demanded the elimination of independent parties. In mid-February of 1948, Soviet armies camped on the border as Gottwald ordered the formation of a new government. A Soviet mission of top officials flew to Prague to demand Benes' surrender. The Communists assumed full control on February 25. Two weeks later Masaryk either committed suicide or, as Truman believed, was the victim of "mysterious circumstances that suggested foul play."²⁷

On March 14, the United States Senate endorsed the Marshall Plan with a vote of 69 to 17.²⁸ As it went to the House for consideration, Truman, fearing "the grave events in Europe (which) were moving so swiftly,"²⁹ decided to appear before the Congress. In a speech remarkable for its single-minded emphasis

²⁷

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, 241.

²⁸

Public Papers of the Presidents, Harry S. Truman, 1947, 183.

²⁹

Public Papers of the Presidents, 183.

on the "increasing threat" to the very "survival of freedom", the President proclaimed that the Marshall Plan was "not enough".³⁰ With perfect timing and somber rhetoric, Truman's March 17 speech not only galvanized the passing of the Plan, but accelerated a change in American foreign policy that had been heralded the previous summer.

The apparent reaction of the Soviet Union to this intensified determination of the United States to forestall further Soviet gains was to increase its pressure upon what was perhaps the most sensitive arena of the cold war: Berlin. The former Nazi capital represented the weakest point in the western position. There existed a special four-power regime, physically separated from West Germany by over one hundred miles of Soviet-controlled territory. But in Berlin, as in West Germany, Allied rights were indisputable. The Western allies, like the Soviets, were there by right of conquest.

30

Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, 243.

The Soviet squeeze on Berlin began in the spring of 1948. The three Western Powers' determination to organize a West German state, heralded by decisions to establish a joint currency for the Western zones, became very clear, and with it grew Soviet determination to block such a step. But despite Soviet protests, the Western powers went ahead with their German program and on June 18 announced a reform of currency in Western Germany to combat inflation.³¹ They had hoped to arrange a four-power control of currency in Berlin but the Soviets did not agree. Thus, when the Western powers introduced new currency in their sector of Berlin, the Soviets retaliated with a land blockade of the city. However, the blockade had begun gradually. In March of 1948, the Soviets walked out of the Allied Control Council for Germany and on April 1st imposed rail and road restrictions on Allied traffic to Berlin. In the middle of June, the Soviets walked out of the Kommandatura, the Allied governing body of Berlin, announcing that the four-power governing body did not

31

Louis J. Halie, The Cold War as History (London, 1967), 164.

exist. Finally, on July 24, 1948, the Soviets shut off all non-Soviet traffic to Berlin, except by air.³²

Many historians have speculated as to why the Soviet Union would take such a risk to bring the world closer to another war. Some have argued that the aim of Soviet policy was that of forcing the western powers out of Berlin.³³ Others believe that there was a bigger goal in Soviet minds. The purpose of the blockade, they argue, was to prevent the creation of a united West Germany. The three Western powers had just adopted currency reform for their zones, a step rightly construed as a major initiative in setting up the future Bonn republic. The Berlin blockade was thus the most efficacious way to re-open the German question as a whole and to force the West to abandon or at least postpone setting up their own West Germany.³⁴

³² Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History, 166.

³³ Colin Brown and Peter Mooney, Cold War to Detente (London, 1978), 29.

³⁴ Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 172-73.

President Truman rejected the idea of using armed convoys to gain access to the blocked city. Instead he decided on a continuous airlift by American and British planes. The planes flew food, fuel, clothing, various raw materials, and medicine into the western sector of Berlin. By the spring of 1949 the Allies were flying in an average of 8000 tons of supplies per day.³⁵

Finally, in return for a Western agreement to hold another meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris on May 23, the Soviet Union lifted the Berlin blockade on May 12, 1949. However, after four weeks of meetings in Paris, the Council of Foreign Ministers produced no new agreement on Germany. It merely confirmed the modus vivendi that had ended the Berlin blockade, and the ensuing relaxation of tensions.³⁶

The airlift success did bring the people of West Germany closer to the United States and helped win their support for a West German state. On May 23,

³⁵ Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Westport, Connecticut, 1950), 86.

³⁶ Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, Vol. II (New York, 1978), 228.

1949, after organizing state governments and adopting a constitution, the West Germans officially proclaimed the German Federal Republic with its capital in Bonn.³⁷ The Soviet zone, in turn, proclaimed a new government for their own zone of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, in October of 1949.³⁸ The two Germanies had come into existence, one anchored in the American bloc and the other tied to the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, at the beginning of the Berlin airlift, Marshal Josep Broz Tito of Yugoslavia had broken with the Soviet Union and the Cominform and thus had opened a significant opportunity for American gain in the Cold War. The break became public in June 1948, and widened as time went on. Ultimately, Tito withdrew support from the Greek Communists, leaving the American-backed Greek national army to crush the guerrillas. By October 1949, therefore, the Greek civil war was over. The Truman doctrine was working.

³⁷ Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, 229.

³⁸ Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany, 86.

Soviet resistance to the Marshall Plan and the Berlin blockade meanwhile increased the desire of the Western European nations for closer military ties with each other and with the United States.³⁹ Even in war-torn West Germany, the hope that neutralism between East and West might be the appropriate policy was effectively demolished, and Communist influence there was rendered relatively insignificant. In America, the general impetus toward mutual security arrangements with Western Europe was strengthened, and on June 11, 1948, the Senate passed the Vandenberg resolution proclaiming American readiness to enter into such arrangements.

39

In March 1948 the British, French, Dutch, Belgium, and Luxembourg government signed--with encouragement from the United States--the Brussels Pact creating the Western European Union. The Pact was a political gesture without much military significance and would remain so unless strengthened by a commitment from the United States. The first steps towards American commitment were taken in the spring of 1948 when the new Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett began parallel conversations with the ambassadors of the Brussels Pact nations on the one hand and with Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, on the other. The result were general international agreement on the desirability of a treaty and, more important, the Vandenberg Resolution cleared the way for American entrance into alliance with the Brussels Pact nations and Canada.

Thus, the Vandenberg resolution cleared the way for strengthening containment with a system of military alliances. Since Senator Arthur Vandenberg was a leading Republican and since the resolution received bipartisan support, it diffused the cold war as a major issue in the presidential campaign of 1948 that followed it. Neither the Democrats led by Truman nor the Republicans led by Thomas E. Dewey differed in America's firm policy towards the cold war. Both supported foreign aid and regional agreements. Public polls pointed to a clear victory for Dewey but the cold war attitude of the superpowers directed Americans to vote for the man with experience.

With the election victory and the Vandenberg resolution behind him, Truman stepped up the on-going negotiation process with the Brussels Pact nations. Secret talks had begun between the British and the Americans with a view to creating an Atlantic security system, which would include the United States. Following the most complex of discussions, a North Atlantic pact was evolved in Washington during the winter of the Berlin airlift; and on April 4, 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came into existence--

the first peacetime military alliance in the history of the American Republic.⁴⁰

Twelve nations sent their foreign ministers to Washington to sign formally the North Atlantic Treaty.⁴¹ The treaty's key paragraph appeared in Article 5 which stated that an armed attack against one or more of the signatories "in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."⁴² In case of an attack, it added, each country, as recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations charter, will assist the party under attack with "such action it deems necessary, including the use of armed force."⁴³ By not pledging signatories to automatic use of military coercion, this provision made the agreement compatible with the constitutional power of Congress to declare war. On the surface, the loophole committed the United States to nothing definite, yet within the context of the treaty the American commitment was strong.

⁴⁰ DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, Vol. II, 229.

⁴¹ The twelve nations included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States.

⁴² William Reitzel and others, United States Foreign Policy 1945-59 (Washington, 1956), 127.

⁴³ Reitzel, U.S. Foreign Policy, 127.

After a sharp debate over the contents of the treaty, the Congress voted approval. On August 25, 1949, after a sufficient number of signatories ratified it, the North Atlantic Treaty went into effect.

By the time NATO came into force, the economic recovery of Western Europe was well under way. In Greece, the Communist partisans had been crushed, while in Germany, West Berlin had been successfully defended. Most important of all, American power was still the ultimate guarantee of Western collective security, for the B-29 atomic bombers of the United States Airforce stationed in Britain since the Berlin Blockade, provided a decisive sanction against Soviet military strength.

No sooner, however, had the North Atlantic Treaty been ratified, at the end of August, when an American patrol aircraft over the Pacific collected a radioactive air sample: the fall-out from "Joe One". The Soviets had exploded an atomic bomb three years ahead of the theoretical schedule assigned to them by the Americans. On September 23, 1949, Truman announced that "we have evidence that within recent weeks an

atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R."⁴⁴ Thus, the American monopoly over the atomic bomb had ended.

The containment policy suffered a great setback with the loss of the monopoly over the Atomic bomb. In essence, containment for all intents and purposes applied exclusively to Western Europe. Its objective was the security of Western Europe which involved the stemming of Soviet expansion in that area. In practice, containment was a regional policy, based on a balance of power concept rather than an ideological conflict despite the rhetorical flourishes. The concept of an ideological conflict seems to have been introduced in an attempt to obscure the reality of a balance of power strategy, a strategy condemned and detested by a large segment of the American people as one hostile to their traditions.

Thus while busy building containment in Europe, American decision-makers were puzzled by the convergence of nationalism and communism in Asia as a mature revolutionary force. In China, the American-

⁴⁴ Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, 307.

supported Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek had been overthrown by a mass movement headed by Mao Tse-tung, while in India, the cry for independence from the British empire, enunciated by Mohandas Gandhi was reaching all parts of the subcontinent.

From the end of the 19th century to the Communist accession to power in 1949, United States concern for China was mainly two-fold: a primary interest in commerce whereby the United States would sell its industrial products in what was to be a vast China market, and a secondary interest in promoting and protecting missionary work, education, and other American cultural endeavors. Translated into action American concern manifested itself with the Open Door Policy, the objective of which was equality of commercial opportunity and respect for China's territorial integrity, and through which the United States hoped to prevent hegemony by European powers and Japan and thus the exclusion of American nationals.⁴⁵

Between 1941 and 1949, however, the United

⁴⁵

Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, 783-85.

States became much more actively involved in China's affairs: first, as an ally during the Second World War, it tried to keep China in the war and second, in the postwar period it hoped to bring stability to the nation through an ambiguous attempt to prevent the Communist overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek's government. After 1949 the United States refused to recognize the new government of Mao Tse-tung and worked to "contain" its power.

The Indian subcontinent which had few if any relations with the United States was also erupting to rid itself of its colonial masters. From the outset of the Second World War, when Britain took India into the war with Germany without consulting Indian opinion, the principal nationalist party--known as the Indian National Congress, or the Congress Party--was in sharp conflict with the authorities. This situation, which involved arrests of Indian spokesmen, extensive political controversy in India, and nationalist appeals to world opinion, stimulated American popular interest in the Indian cause.

CHAPTER 2

Containment and the Indian Subcontinent (1947-1952)

The official relations between the United States and unpartitioned India began only during the Second World War. Before then India's foreign affairs were handled by the British Foreign Office. This clear lack of a direct relationship led to ignorance on both sides.

For most Americans at that time, India had an ill-defined interest as a land of romantic color, ancient splendor, poverty and varied religions characterized as debased, curious, or profound, according to the commentator's prepossessions. A number of Americans had a vague opinion of Indians as cruel, arising from distant reports of the Black Hole of Calcutta (1756) and the Sepoy Mutiny (1857-1858).¹ There were also some Americans who knew that certain Indians with strong nationalist aspirations were seeking their country's freedom from Britain, but

¹

W. Norman Brown, The U.S. and India and Pakistan, Bangladesh (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 390.

they usually had little if any knowledge of the origins, aims, and problems of Indian nationalism, and their views were determined by an unreasoning uninquiring Anglophobia.²

It was not until the Second World War that the Indian subcontinent became a factor in United States foreign policy. Unpartitioned India was an essential part of the China-Burma-India (CBI) theatre of operations. Many thousands of American soldiers were stationed in various parts of the subcontinent, especially in Assam, and in and around the port cities of Calcutta, Karachi, and Bombay. This presence of American soldiers brought about the first large-scale meeting of Americans and Indians.³

It was during the Second World War that American politicians pushed the idea of an independent India to their British counterparts. On the urging of his advisers in Washington, and of two personal representatives whom he sent to India, Colonel Louis

²
391. Brown, The U.S. and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,

³
391. Brown, The U.S. and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,

Johnson and William Phillips, President Franklin Roosevelt made several efforts to persuade Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain to make real concessions to India.⁴ These efforts though ill-received by the British Prime Minister, represented honest, even if perhaps very discreet, efforts on the part of the United States, and they were concrete evidences of official American interest in India's freedom struggle.

When the subcontinent finally achieved independence in August of 1947, it was plunged into vicious communal strife, violence, and chaos, with partition looming as the foremost and most fundamental problem.⁵ It produced two mutually antipathic and suspicious nations which, due to the corrosive inheritance of the past, clashed on a number of basic issues.

As a result of the partition, two new dominions, India and Pakistan, were brought forth in August of

⁴ Brown, The U.S. and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 397.

⁵ G.W. Choudhury, "U.S. Policy Towards the Sub-continent," Pacific Community (October 1973), 99.

1947, with financial assets divided in such a way that India was to obtain 82.5 per cent and Pakistan 17.5 per cent.⁶ Pakistan, the new nation, consisted of two areas, East and West Pakistan, both governed from the new capital of Karachi and separated by almost one thousand miles of Indian territory.⁷

The United States' response to the creation of the two nations was positive. President Harry S. Truman, in separate letters to the leaders of the two nations wrote:

We welcome India's new and enhanced status in the world community of sovereign independent states and assure the new dominion of our continued friendship and goodwill.⁸

On this auspicious day which marks the emergence among the family of nations of the new dominion of Pakistan, I assure you that the new dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of the United States of America.⁹

⁶ Choudhury, "U.S. Policy Towards the Subcontinent," Pacific Community (October 1973), 101.

⁷ Brown, The U.S. and India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 21.

⁸ Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945-46, 581.

⁹ Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945-46, 582.

The Indian subcontinent, a region of major American involvement by the mid 1950's, at first received little attention from the policy-makers in Washington; in 1947 the United States, like the Soviet Union, was preoccupied with more urgent problems in Europe and the Far East. The major problem arising from the United States' foreign policy now was relations with the Soviet Union. Since the Indian subcontinent was comparatively free from immediate Cold War tension, Washington could afford to confine its role in this area to pious and friendly gestures of good will.

Thus, for the first two years after the subcontinent gained independence, its official relations with the United States were rather formal, not close. It can be assumed that both of the newly independent nations and the United States were busy with problems which were of little direct concern, at that time, to the other.

With a powerful and resourceful country like the United States of America, India wanted to maintain friendly but not subservient relations. At the same time India looked forward to maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, on

December 4, 1947, against the background of the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, Soviet condemnation of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the Communist Information Bureau, the Indian Prime Minister Jawarhlal Nehru gave expression to his feeling that the great rival powers and blocs had realized that India had "an independent policy."¹⁰ In a speech to the Indian Constituent Assembly, Nehru went on to declare that:

we propose to keep on the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves create difficulties. We shall be friends with America. We intend cooperating with the United States of America and we intend cooperating fully with the Soviet Union.¹¹

The above-mentioned statement was typical of the stands taken by Indian leaders during the post-independence period. This policy was labelled as a non-aligned position. The non-aligned stand toward the two blocs evolved slowly from the days of the sub-continent's struggle against the British government.

Even before independence, Indian leaders

¹⁰

Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy, 99.

¹¹

Nehru, Independence and After, 205.

were busy evolving a policy which was distinctive. The very first announcement on India's foreign policy after independence was made on September 7, 1946. This announcement of non-alignment was conditioned by the growing division of world Politics into two blocs as reflected in the proceedings of the San Francisco Conference of the twenty-one nations which had won the Second World War.

The Indian policy displayed an awareness that the world was still "full of conflict and thoughts of war,"¹² the perception that the world, nevertheless, moved towards "the building up of a world commonwealth"¹³ and the determination to work in that direction. Three months after the December 4, 1947 speech, against a further background of the anti-Titoist drive within the communist bloc, the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty and other moves for Western European defence, Prime Minister Nehru noted "a great deterioration" having taken place "in the international sphere," admitted that India, too, "was pulled hither and thither"

¹² Nehru, India's Foreign Policy Speeches September 1946-April 1961, 26.

¹³ Nehru, Speeches, 28.

by the "bigger and deeper forces" affecting the world, including the strongest of nations, and dismissed the idea of blindly rushing in one direction for certain petty advantages.¹⁴

With the Berlin crisis at hand and the Atlantic pact in the making, Nehru further expressed India's confidence in the value of non-alignment for peace and regretted Europe's legacies of the past conflict. What one gathers from Nehru's statements is that the degenerating international situation in the post-war world of the 1940's had a steadying effect on India's policy of non-alignment.

However only two years after her independence, India seemed to incline towards the western bloc. This tendency though was short-lived and was mainly compelled by economic needs. It is important moreover to remember that the young nation, even at this time of relatively warm relations with the West, refused to commit herself to the American-led western bloc's view of the "Containment thesis." India's movement towards the western bloc

¹⁴

Nehru, Speeches, March 8, 1948, 35-37.

was slow but perceptible. The two most outstanding events of 1949 which confirm this view were her joining the Commonwealth and Nehru's visit to the United States.

The Indian Prime Minister's visit to the United States in October of 1949 was significant in many ways. Nehru's visit coming against the background of the Chinese Revolution impelled the United States to look towards India as an ally in Asia, while India, facing the problem of food scarcity as well as having long-standing needs of economic and technical aid, foreign loans and investment, seemed to welcome such an interest.

On October 13, 1949, addressing the joint houses of the United States Congress, Nehru declared that "however the voice of India and the United States appear to differ, there is much in common between them."¹⁵ He stated that the objectives of India's foreign policy "are the preservation of world peace and enlargement of human freedom."¹⁶ He further reaffirmed his policy of

¹⁵ Bright, J.S. ed., Important Speeches or Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. II, 1946-51 (New Delhi, 1951), 551.

¹⁶ Bright, Important Speeches, 552.

nonalignment, but significantly concluded:

we are neither blind to reality nor do we propose to acquiesce in any challenge to man's freedom from whatever quarter it may come. Where freedom is menaced or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot and shall not be neutral.¹⁷

This speech was well received not only by the politicians but also by the American press who interpreted it as an indication that India shared the ideological stand of the United States against the Soviet bloc.

While the American press gave a favorable expression to Nehru's speech, the Soviet media took exception to the statement that India would not remain neutral in all circumstances. The Soviet interpretation was that Nehru had endorsed the United States' policy of containment.¹⁸ However, a careful analysis of Nehru's speech in the United States indicates that he repeatedly stressed the policy of non-alignment. But since the timing of the visit coincided with the apparent American failure in China, he was, one could argue,

¹⁷ Bright, Important Speeches, 556.

¹⁸ The New Times (Moscow), January 12, 1949.

trying to make use of the favourable mood in the United States to offset the loss of China by coming to India's needs.

There can be little doubt that this favourable mood of the United States towards India was connected with the China policy failure... In the summer and autumn of 1949, the review of the United States' Asian policy was proceeding under the general direction of Philip C. Jessup.¹⁹ In a secret memorandum to Jessup, on July 18, 1949, Dean Acheson, American Secretary of State, had communicated that:

You will please take your assumption that it is a fundamental decision of American policy that the United States does not intend to permit further extension of communist domination on the continent of Asia or in the South-East Asia area. Will you please draw up for me possible specific areas not under communist control under which the United States would have the best chance of achieving this purpose. The program should contain proposed courses of action, steps to be taken in implementing such programs, estimates of cost to the United States and the extent to which the United States forces would or would not be involved.²⁰

19

J. C. Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954 (New York, 1955), 117.

20

Full Text in The New York Times, October 5, 1951.

The aim, of course, was to win Nehru's support for this policy. Walter Lippmann of the New York Herald Tribune had pointed out in January 1949, the reasons for this shift:

....where, then, shall we look for allies, now that nationalist China, the Netherlands and France are so manifestly unable to play the role in Asia which we had supposed they would play. That, it seems to me, is the fundamental problem which has to be solved in order to form an American policy in Asia.... We would be well advised, I think, to enter into intimate consultations with Nehru about our whole course in China and Indonesia.²¹

Early in October 1949, Owen Lattimore, an expert on Far Eastern affairs at Johns Hopkins University wrote:

Counteracting this development (Communist victory in China), Washington is no longer 'waiting for the dust to settle.' A drive is being set up to make India--not Pakistan--a major sector of U.S. world policy. The drive will be launched during or after the American visit of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.²²

The New York Times, not to be left out of the major shift in American foreign policy, commented on October 16, 1949:

²¹

The New York Herald Tribune, January 10, 1949.

²²

Sunday Compass (New York), October 9, 1949.

For months as communist armies have swept across China, Washington's hopes for a democratic rallying point in Asia have been pinned on India, the second biggest Asiatic nation, and on the man who determines India's policy, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru....the United States is seeking a way to reassert Western influence and thus prevent a further spread of communism in the Far East. To this end Washington is trying to enlist the support of Prime Minister Nehru, the unofficial spokesman for most of South East Asia.²³

Thus these and many other comments along the same line indicated the newly-found importance that India had acquired in the American plans of containing the spread of international communism. If the development of a close U.S.-India relationship needed any more support, the Soviet Union provided it. The New Times, published from Moscow stated:

Congress leaders have made a deal with Anglo-American Imperialism and Indian reactionaries to fight their own people. Now the struggle for real independence of India, for the interests of the laboring masses is continuing, outside the congress and against it.²⁴

²³

The New York Times, October 16, 1949.

²⁴

The New Times (Moscow), January 12, 1949.

Furthermore, the fact that Nehru went to the United States at the risk of creating Soviet suspicions showed that India was not prepared to give up her desire for close economic co-operation with the United States and other countries of the western bloc, because it might not please Moscow, as indeed it did not. An argument could be made that if India was not at the time with the United States and the western bloc, she was much less with the Communist bloc or Soviet Russia; if anything, the inclination was towards the former.

After his return from the United States, the Indian Prime Minister was convinced neither of the righteousness of the western cause nor of the wrongs of the communist side. Aiming to stay neutral, he wished to be on good terms with both Moscow and Washington. This stand which the New York Times termed the "double standard"²⁵ brought criticism from western nations. Thus while economic relations remained good, an area of misunderstanding was growing between Washington and New Delhi.

25

✓ The New York Times, February 24, 1950.

Only two months after his trip to the United States, Nehru showed India's independence from United States influence by announcing his decision to recognize the Chinese People's Republic of Mao tse-Tung as the official government of China.²⁶ This decision of December 30, 1949 may be regarded as the beginning of some serious differences between the foreign policy of India and that of the United States.

Another perhaps more serious difference between the two nations occurred when the North Koreans attacked South Korea in late June of 1950.²⁷ The Korean war had two different connotations for India. First, aggression by North Korea had been committed and thus had to be dealt with. Second, the Korean War had the potential of becoming a large scale world war and somehow that had to be prevented.²⁸ The American view, on the other hand, was simply that international communism was trying to achieve by force what it could not achieve

²⁶ Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy, 119.

²⁷ Bowles, Ambassador's Report, 238.

²⁸ Nehru's Press Conference, 1950, 104-111.

otherwise. Thus, there was to be no appeasement and force had to be met by force. And "if this led to war the communist must be blamed for it."²⁹

Furthermore, from the American point of view, the communist aggression, doubtlessly inspired by the Soviet Union and China, justified taking unilateral action in Formosa in the interests of security and postponing the recognition of Communist China until after a settlement of the Korean issue. Thus, these were, broadly, the respective views of India and the United States when the reprehensible action of North Korea plunged the world into a situation of grave crisis.

The most fundamental issue that determined their divergent approaches to the Korean conflict was the issue of international communism. To the United States' government, the predominant issue in world affairs at the time was the "aggressive" and "expansionist" nature of international communism; all other issues, such as European colonialism, racial domination and discrimination, the place of Asia and Africa in

29

Radio address by President Truman, September 1, 1950 on the "Aims and Objectives" of resisting aggression in Korea. Doc. Am. Foreign Relations. 1950, 9-12.

world affairs, were of secondary, if not incidental, importance. The American view was that once the spread of communism would be "contained" to the Soviet Union, other problems could be quickly solved. Consequently, the only true index of the success of American foreign policy--and with that, of the policies of the "free world"--was to what extent communism and the communist nations were curbed in their international activities--and not by the extent to which the wishes and aspirations of other nations, especially those of Asia and Africa, were fulfilled or their problems solved.

The Government of India's approach differed entirely from this position; indeed in its opinion, communism was hardly an issue. Even though the Government of India was occasionally critical of international communism, it did not consider it an international issue as such. The question was an internal political problem of nations, and each nation would have to deal with it according to its own local conditions and circumstances.

Since the aggression, which the Indian government recognized had taken place, had come from communist North Korea, India was careful not to give room for

any suggestion that as a result of her position on the North Korean aggression, she was ready to condemn the whole Communist world as "aggressors" and that she was finally aligned with the Western bloc. In pursuance of this purpose, India did not send any troops to the aid of the South Korean Republic although she had agreed in her communication of June 29, 1950 that "the halting of the aggression and the quick restoration of peaceful conditions are essential preludes to a satisfactory settlement."³⁰

To the United States, the moral issues were clear. In South Korea, aggression had been committed by the North Korean communist regime. The United States with the support of other non-communist countries, was ready to take this opportunity to impress on the communists that aggression did not pay. Thus, even before the Security Council's resolution of June 27, 1950, the United States was taking steps to halt the aggression. India had accepted the two Security Council resolutions of June 25 (calling on the North

³⁰

Kundra, Indian Foreign Policy, 126-127.

Koreans to withdraw back to the 38th parallel and cease hostilities) and June 27 (asking members of the United Nations "to furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.")³¹

However, on July 7, 1950, India abstained on a resolution to authorise the United States to set up a unified command for all foreign forces in South Korea, but subsequently declared its acceptance of the idea and sent an ambulance unit of over 300 officers and men to serve under General Douglas MacArthur, who was appointed to head the unified command.³² On September 7, the Indian delegate at the United Nations opposed a Soviet resolution³³ in the Security Council calling for an end to the indiscriminate bombing of civilians.

These actions were highly appreciated by the United States Government. As the American Defence De-

³¹

Security Council Resolution S/1501, June 25, 1950 and Security Council Resolution S/1511, June 27, 1950.

³²

Natrajan, American Shadow over India (Delhi, 1956), 129.

³³

Natrajan, American Shadow Over India, 129.

partment noted later: "...at what history will probably consider the most crucial point in postwar world affairs, so far, India was with the United States."³⁴ The New York Times on July 7, 1950 praised Nehru's support of the United States as courageous:

....in this instance Pandit Nehru.... has risked offending a large section of the Indian public that is ultra-sensitive on the East-West question. That is why his action is being hailed as a courageous one.

Upon the outbreak of hostilities in Korea many influential newspapers asserted that the struggle there was a matter of internal unrest that should be left to settle itself. President Truman's pronouncement and the immediate employment of U.S. arms were condemned as another instance of western intervention in purely Asian affairs.³⁵

: In another report from New Delhi, Robert Trumbull of the New York Times reported on August 19:

Although the Indian Parliament is on record as having unanimously approved Nehru's actions regarding Korea, this is most misleading. Close observers of Parliament feel that, had a free vote been taken,

34

U.S. Office of the Sec. of Defence, Armed Forces Information and Education Division, Armed Forces Talk No. 391, India-Oriental "Third Force", Nov 16, 1951, 13.

35

New York Times, July 7, 1950.

without the stern exercise of Congress party discipline Nehru would have had little more than a fifty-fifty chance of winning.³⁶

Another report in the New York Times evaluated Nehru's foreign policy in not unfriendly terms:

In China he is the strongest champion of the Communist Government outside of Russia. This Indian attitude toward China is understandable. But it is our contention that (the Chinese issue should not be concealing to use the China issue as a bribe and appeasement to the Russians,) Nehru has embarrassed and weakened the west....

Yet Pandit Nehru has condemned the Korean aggression. As he said yesterday, he and India were never neutral. They are in the democratic fold, which should mean that whenever a choice is forced between the Communists and the West, as it was over Korea, India will be on our side. So long as we fight for freedom and democracy, no Government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru is going to oppose us.³⁷

Throughout the summer of 1950, the State Department continued to put its hope on gaining Nehru's support. Reflecting this view, the New York Times declared:

36

The New York Times, August 19, 1950.

37

The New York Times, August 5, 1950.

The struggle for Asia conceivably could be won or lost in the mind of one man--Jawaharlal Nehru... He is in a sense the counterweight on the democratic side to Mao tse-Tung on the Communist side. To have Pandit Nehru as an ally in the struggle for Asiatic support is worth many divisions; to have him as an opponent or even a critic would jeopardise the position of western democracy throughout Asia....³⁸

However, when the American press indicated that General MacArthur was bent on occupying the whole of North Korea, and the Chinese government informed the Indian ambassador to Peking that it would not remain indifferent to the approach of American forces to China's borders, the Indian government became concerned with the possibility of an extension of conflict beyond Korea. It was for these reasons that the Indian representative abstained on a United Nations resolution which implicitly authorised the crossing of the 38th parallel, advocating instead an effort to achieve a peaceful solution.³⁹

³⁸

The New York Times, August 29, 1950.

³⁹

Natrajan, American Shadow Over India, 132.

Thus on October 16, 1950 Prime Minister Nehru declared his opposition to the United States' proposals to circumvent the rule of Big Power unanimity in the Security Council and to put armed forces at the disposal of the General Assembly. Nehru argued:

We did not agree with proposals to create separate armed forces on behalf of the United Nations into a larger edition of the Atlantic Pact and make it a war organization more than one devoted to international peace.⁴⁰

The American reaction to Indian "obstructionism" was indeed violent. The New York Times editorial of October 12, 1950 declared:

The attacks of Indian and Pakistani delegates on the United States at the international conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Lucknow are hard to take at a time when American blood is being spilled and American money taken from all taxpayers to help Asia preserve her independence and raise her standard of living.....

It would be a derogation of the duty of a friendly newspaper not to make it clear that Americans are also sorely disappointed with the politics pursued by Prime Minister Nehru concerning Korea.....

40

Quoted in Natrajan, American Shadow Over India, 132.

Pandit Nehru surports to speak for Asia, but it is the voice of abnegation; his criticism now turns out to have been obstructive, his policy is appeasement. Worst of all, one fails to find a valid moral judgement in his attitude. One can feel certain that history will condemn the Nehru policy as well-intentioned but timid, short sighted and irresponsible.... he is doing wrong to the cause of freedom of Asian nationalism, of justice and right.⁴¹

Early in 1951 the United States was confronted with what Robert Trumbull of the New York Times called "a peculiarly favorable moment.....for a fruitful U.S. venture to cement the friendship of the elusive Indian public opinion at this critical time in Asia."⁴²

Faced with the prospect of a desperately critical food shortage, Prime Minister Nehru approached the United States for a wheat loan, and thus Washington thought it had found the way to make New Delhi behave.

The U.S. News and World Report declared in its issue of January 19, 1951:

Jawahrlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister, may have to wait a long

⁴¹

The New York Times, October 12, 1950.

⁴²

The New York Times, January 14, 1951.

time before he gets the 2 million tons of U.S. grain that, he wants as a gift. This country's officials are not impressed by India's attitude toward aggression of China in Korea or by the degree of cooperation in building defences.⁴³

Two days later, the Associated Press of America reported:

.....officials said the Indian Prime Minister is being less than helpful with his repeated demands for admission of New China to the UN, for a negotiated settlement on Korea, and his outspoken opposition to condemning the Chinese as aggressors.⁴⁴

Senator Tom Connolly, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, declared on January 25 that action on the Indian request would be delayed until a subcommittee "looks into the whole question of U.S. relations with India."⁴⁵ However, in a special message on February 12, President Truman recommended emergency assistance to India.⁴⁶ Three days later a bill to provide this assistance, calling for an immediate shipment of a million tons of American surplus

⁴³ The U.S. News and World Report, January 19, 1951.

⁴⁴ Daily Compass, New York, January 22, 1951.

⁴⁵ The New York Times, January 26, 1951.

⁴⁶ Norman Palmer, South Asia and U.S. Policy (New York, 1966), 15.

wheat on a grant basis to India, and authorizing the eventual shipment of another million tons, was introduced in the Congress by a bipartisan group of forty senators and representatives. Early in March the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported the bill favorably; but as the New York Times later stated, "a small group of men concentrated in that legislative graveyard called the Rules Committee blocked the measure for several weeks until it was rewritten in the form of a loan."⁴⁷

In late April, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which had been quite desultory in its considerations of the presumably emergency legislation, recommended a version of the original bill which had been revised to be partly loan, and partly grant.⁴⁸ At about the same time the House of Representatives postponed floor action on the bill, apparently out of pique over a statement by Prime Minister Nehru to the effect that

47

The New York Times, May 4, 1951.

48

Palmer, South Asia and U.S. Policy, 15.

he would "not barter away India's self-respect or freedom of action even for something we need so badly."⁴⁹ As the New York Times declared, "what could and should have been a magnanimous, humanitarian gesture from one people to another has had all the heart taken out of it."⁵⁰

American-Indian relations reached a critical stage when the United States proposed a peace treaty for Japan, providing for the retention of American bases in that country and leaving American forces in occupation of the Ryukyu and Bonin islands. John Foster Dulles, the author of this treaty, "snubbed New Delhi by sending only a deputy for consultations, and Indian suggestions for amending the draft were ignored.

Robert Trumbull explained in the New York Times of September 2, 1951:

Indians who should be closer to Mr. Nehru's mind than most foreign observers were saying tonight that Washington might have won Mr. Nehru over if the treaty drafters had shown greater solicitude for his opinions.⁵¹

49

Palmer, South Asia and U.S. Policy, 15.

50

The New York Times, May 4, 1951.

51

The New York Times, September 2, 1951.

Thus, when the Indian government insisted on its amendments and refused to sign the American-sponsored Japanese Peace Treaty, the reaction from the American press was abusive. The New York Daily Mirror accused Prime Minister Nehru of Asiatic intrigue and charged that "one of the enemies of this country is the India of Nehru."⁵² The Associated Press reported from Washington on August 27 that "India's boycott of the Japanese Peace Treaty conference may bring about a tougher U.S. policy toward her."⁵³ The New York World Telegram and Sun spoke of Nehru's "unmitigated gall."⁵⁴ On September 6, columnist George E. Sokolsky charged Nehru with a "mercantlist nature" and having relations with communism at least since 1929.⁵⁵ Finally, the New York Times declared in an editorial on "The Lost Leader":

⁵² The New York Daily Mirror, August 28, 1951.

⁵³ The Associated Press, August 27, 1951.

⁵⁴ The New York World-Telegram and Sun, August 27, 1951.

⁵⁵ Quoted in Natrajan, American Shadow Over India, 136.

Jawaharlal Nehru is fast becoming one of the great disappointments of the post war era... To the West, he seemed (a few years ago) a logical champion of a free, democratic, anti-Communist Asia, and the India he directed was the obvious candidate for the leadership of Asia.....

Instead of seizing the leadership of Asia for its good, Nehru turned aside from the responsibilities, proclaimed India's disinterestedness, and tried to set up an "independent" third force India, suspended in mid-air between the two decisive movements of our day--the Communism that Russia heads and the democracy of which the United States is the chief champion.

So he and India went into a limbo. It was an abnegation of greatness and history is not likely to forgive it.⁵⁶

Only six months after the above condemnation of India's Prime Minister, illustrating the "ups and downs" of Indian-American relations, the New York Times noted that "the past few months have seen a remarkable improvement in relations between India and the United States."⁵⁷ The Times attributed this improvement to a variety of factors, including increasing

⁵⁶

The New York Times, August 28, 1951.

⁵⁷

The New York Times, March 9, 1952.

contacts between Indians and Americans, the favorable impression created by Chester Bowles, the new ambassador to India, the actual arrival of the first shipments of wheat under the wheat loan agreement of 1951, and the announcement in January 1952 of a \$54 million program of direct assistance to India.⁵⁸

After spending a week as Nehru's guest in New Delhi, longtime member of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, David E. Lilienthal, wrote in Collier's of June 23, 1951:

We are witnessing today what may be the beginning of the end of friendly relations with India, just as only a few years ago (though at the time most people did not recognize the fact) we began the process of losing out in China. If we lose out in India, as we have in China, all hope for us on the continent of Asia is gone. The World balance of population will be overwhelmingly against us.....Our course, in general, seems to me plain: to encourage and aid Nehru and his people in the development of a modern nation...

This program need not and should not involve expenditures on a huge scale, such as the European Marshall Plan, (so long as the air is so under) as to India's direction and her prospects.

But to do nothing, to pursue a general policy of fence-sitting on our part, an attitude of "wait and see", will increase the risk of failure, might even ensure that failure.⁵⁹

The Republican Newspaper publisher John Cowles wrote in Look in September 1951:

We will be making a blunder almost as calamitous as the one we made in China if we don't support the Nehru Government in India, even though we may be irritated over what we think are inconsistencies in Nehru's attitude. . . . If the United States is so foolish as to undermine Nehru's already-weakening regime in India, the government or the chaos that comes after it in the World's second most populous nation may be far less to our liking.⁶⁰

Thus many influential Americans had already begun to realize that a harder line policy in Asia was leading to America's isolation. The Korean War was deadlocked, and the Japanese Peace Treaty had aroused resentment all over the Far East. In Japan itself, the continued presence of American troops was evoking unexpectedly strong opposition. The United States could not afford a further straining of relations with India.

⁵⁹ David E. Lilienthal, Collier's June 23, 1951.

⁶⁰ John Cowles, Look, Sept. 1951.

To make a new start, the United States sent Chester Bowles as Ambassador to New Delhi in October 1951. As his first major task, Bowles sought to obtain a large Point Four grant for India and signed an agreement with the Indian Government on January 7, 1952, in the midst of the first Indian general election.⁶¹

The New York Times reported from New Delhi on November 17, 1951:

There is genuine regret here that India's attitudes in the past have antagonised U.S. opinion and it is clear that some care will be taken to avoid this in future.....

It can be said fairly that the only important difference existing between Indian and U.S. foreign policy now concerns Communist China.⁶²

On January 26, 1952, the New York Times expressed editorial satisfaction that:

Taking the whole complex of relationship between our two countries, it is a fact that they are more friendly and understanding today than six months or a year ago..... When we quarrel with India or India with us it is on details, not fundamentals....⁶³

61

Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep (New York, 1971),

62

The New York Times, November 17, 1951.

63

The New York Times, January 26, 1952.

Many American decision-makers came to believe that China had been lost because of undue emphasis on military measures, and they wished to prevent a similar development in India by economic and political means. As Chester Bowles wrote in the New York Times Magazine of March 23, 1952:

...if democracy fails in India, this failure may spell the defeat of democracy throughout Asia. From Cairo to Tokyo the free nations of Asia, stunned and outflanked may well turn inevitably toward Communist China and totalitarianism for the answer to their problems.....

The communist victory in China was a bitter experience. For many months we have been in a sharp debate as to who was wrong and who was right. But as Paul Hoffman has justly said, India in 1952 stands where China stood in 1946. Surely it is a time to bury the political hatchet and prevent a new catastrophe which would be even more disastrous.

Certainly China has taught us that any effective effort to strengthen Asian democracy cannot be simply a question of tanks and planes. We must have the insight to conceive of a free democratic Asia in terms of more food, or irrigated fields, of improved public health and literacy, of opportunity and hope for hundreds of millions of people on whom the pressure of communism is increasingly great.⁶⁴

Thus, economic aid became a key element of the Truman administration towards India. At the same time, the failure of the pro-American right wing to capture the Congress in 1951 and the utter defeat of the pro-American groups in the general elections of 1951-52 convinced the United States that she had to rely on Nehru for the achievement of her foreign policy aims in India.⁶⁵ American diplomacy throughout the ambassadorship of Chester Bowles was directed toward cultivating the friendship of Nehru and his supporters rather than encouraging the development of separate pro-American groups.

However the results of the American presidential election in November 1952 were something of a surprise, and even a shock, in India. Almost all the leading Indian newspapers indulged in an analysis of the factors behind General Dwight D. Eisenhower's victory, and publicly expressed their regret at the decision of the American voters. Once again there was a sharp deterioration in relations, symbolized, for example, by rumors that a political appointee unknown in India would replace the popular Chester Bowles.⁶⁶

⁶⁵Natrajan, American Shadow Over India, 146.⁶⁶Natrajan, American Shadow Over India, 148.

The first United States Ambassador to the newly-created state of Pakistan, Paul H. Alling, arrived in Karachi in 1947 and Governor-General Quaid-i-Azam Munammad Ali Jinnah referred to the great tradition of American democracy while accepting his credentials.⁶⁷ America's lack of interest in the newly-created state was indicated by the delay until 1950 of the replacement of the first ambassador, whose stay in Pakistan was limited to five months because of illness and subsequent death.

The United States had no doubt attached greater importance to India because of her larger size and past history. Whereas such Indian leaders as Monandas Gandhi and Nehru were well known in the United States, those from Pakistan were not so well known. It was not until August 1947 that the Pakistani Foreign Office at Karachi was set up amid utter turmoil with practically no available resources in men and material. "I shall never forget," recalls Vincent Sheen, "that when I first visited the new establishment.....there was only one typewriter in the whole Foreign Office."⁶⁸

⁶⁷
Choudhury, "U.S. Policy Towards the Subcontinent," Pacific Comm (Oct. '73), 103.

⁶⁸
Vincent Sheen, Nehru, 93.

The relations between the United States and Pakistan remained rather formal until the visit of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to Washington in late 1950. During this visit, the American press welcomed the leader of a newly independent state with warm words. The New York Times declared:

These new democracies are showing great vitality and keen ambition. They have been well represented in the United Nations and have been vigorous in their approach to its problems. We want to get better acquainted with them on the personal as well as political basis and the visits of the heads of governments help to serve that end.⁶⁹

On his visit to the United States, Liaquat Ali Khan expressed the great desire of Pakistan to move closer to the United States. He admired Americans for having "uncompromising regard for the supremacy of the people's will."⁷⁰ These words were no doubt quite heartening to the Americans especially when Nehru, during his visit in October 1949, instead of showing any appreciation for the United States policy had im-

⁶⁹

The New York Times, December 12, 1949.

⁷⁰

Khan, Liaquat Ali, Pakistan: The Heart of Asia (Cambridge, 1950), 4.

plicitly and modestly disapproved of it. The United States policy of making regional alliances must have been in Nehru's mind when he declared that "I have felt that....it was far more important to have a certain mutual appreciation and respectthan merely to do it in a business like way as if making a deal. There is no question of making a deal."⁷¹

When there was no hope of "making a deal" with India, the American decision-makers turned to Pakistan. Therefore, the visit of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan delighted U.S. officials. Alben W. Barkley, the Vice-President of the United States, while replying to Liaquat Ali Khan's address to the Senate, said:

We have had many distinguished guests who had addressed the Senate of the United States....no address had been more inspiring, more appreciated than this one delivered by the new Prime Minister of a new free country. It is an inspiration and a source of encouragement that from the other side of the world has come to us this distinguished representative of democracy and self-government.⁷²

71

Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the United States," The New Republic, August 10, 1959, 13.

72

Congressional Record (U.S.), vol. 96 (1950), 6403.

This visit's impact on the evolution of a U.S.-Pakistani military alliance can be understood by remembering that while in 1949, the United States refused to sell armaments to both India and Pakistan because of the tense relations between the two, in 1950 Pakistan would succeed in purchasing ammunition from the United States without any objection from official circles.⁷³

This turn in American attitude no doubt was connected to the behaviour of India and Pakistan in their foreign policy. Mainly, it was the Korean war and the question of the Japanese Peace Treaty which finally alienated the United States from India and brought Pakistan and America closer. Pakistan had promptly offered to send troops to Korea but refrained from doing so in the end because the United States would not promise the undertaking to assist her if India attacked her.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, she was one of the co-sponsors of the General Assembly resolution which impliedly authorized the United Nations forces

73

The New York Times, May 21, 1950.

74

M.A.H. Ispahani, "The Foreign Policy of Pakistan 1947-1964," Pak Horizon, 3rd Quarter, 1964.

to cross the 38th parallel in pursuit of the Communists.⁷⁵

The alliance that emerged between the United States and Pakistan in the last two years of the Truman administration was primarily "an offspring of her (Pakistan's) desire to seek security against alleged aggressive intentions of India and the desire of the United States to take advantage of Pakistan's strategic location for containing communism in Asia."⁷⁶ In essence, the containment of the Soviet Union became the first consideration in the Asian policy of the United States as it also had been in its European policy.⁷⁷

With the outbreak of the Korean War and the consolidation of the Communists in China, the United States naturally sought new allies to "contain" the spread of international communism. The much-feared expansion of communism in Asia was deemed by American diplomats as a manifestation of the Russo-Chinese design to endanger the interests of America in the world.

75

S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policy, 128.

76

Sinha, Pakistan and the India-U.S. Relations, 107.

77

Hasan K. Sarwar, "The Background of American Aid to Pakistan," Pakistan Horizon, vol. XX, No. 2, Second Quarter, 1967.

Henry A. Kissinger wrote:

And it would be the height of folly for the Soviet Union to attack the United States directly and thereby unleash S.A.C. (Strategic Air Command). The Soviets can achieve their ultimate goal, the neutralization of the U.S., at much less risk by gradually eroding the peripheral areas, which will imperceptibly shift the balance of power against us without ever presenting us with a clear-cut challenge.⁷⁸

As early as 1947, when the American government gave little importance to Pakistan, there were a few scholars who recognized the important geopolitical situation of Pakistan. Andrew Roth wrote in the Nation: "Pakistan is.... unquestionably worthy of attention, for it is situated just where the Anglo-American and Soviet orbits touch in the strategic central Asian theatre."⁷⁹ Olaf Caroe in an article in the Round Table further emphasized the importance of Pakistan when he wrote:

In this quarter, as on the North-West Frontier, Pakistan has succeeded to much of India's responsibility, for the Gulf opens directly on Karachi, in a real sense its terminus....the importance of the

78

Henry Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the Grey Areas," Foreign Affairs, vol. 33, No. 3, April 1955, 417.

79

Andrew Roth, "Jinnah's New Republic," The Nation, Vol. 165, No. 24, December 13, 1947, 647.

Gulf grows greater, not less, as the need for fuel expands, the world contracts, and the shadows lengthen from the north. Its stability can be assured only by the closest accord between the states which surround this Muslim lake, an accord underwritten by the Great Powers whose interests are engaged.⁸⁰

However, at the same time he believed that the importance of Pakistan became greater when India due to her adherence to the policy of non-alignment refused to join the alliance of either of the two power blocs. Keeping this point in view, Caroe wrote in his book Wells of Power: "India is no longer an obvious base for Middle Eastern defence. It stands on the fringe of the defence periphery. Pakistan on the other hand lies well within the grouping of South-Western Asia, as seen from the air."⁸¹

Highlighting the importance of Pakistan in the defence system of the Middle Eastern countries, he pointed out that Pakistan was almost a Persian Gulf power. He wrote:

⁸⁰ Caroe, "MMVX", The Round Table, Vol. XXXIX, No. 154, March 1949, 135-6.

⁸¹ Sir Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power (London, 1951), 180.

The horizon seen from the air, covers the north western part of the Indian Ocean theatre, land and sea, but it extends further west over the Eastern Mediterranean. It includes Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan as essential segments of the northern periphery. And, as before, a circle which fails to embrace Pakistan is incomplete.⁸²

Selig. S. Harrison, the associated editor of the New Republic has commented that Olaf Caroe was chiefly responsible for the American alliance policy in Asia. In an article in The New Republic, he points out that it was Caroe's idea, as propounded in the Wells of Power, which was followed by the American strategists in South East and Middle Asia.⁸³

Thus while Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan, assassinated in 1951, did not live long enough to see the results of his plans for American military and economic assistance, the last two years of the Truman administration indicated a definite trend toward forging closer links with Pakistan that assumed formal shape in 1953 when Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower came to the American presidency.

82

Caroe, Wells of Power, 179.

83

Selig Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the United States: Case History of a Mistake," The New Republic, Vol. 141, No. 6-7, August 10, 1959.

Shortly after Eisenhower's victory in November of 1952, Admiral Arthur W. Redford, Chief of the United States Naval Staff, arrived in Pakistan for discussions with Governor-General Chulam Mohammad and Commander-in-Chief General Ayub Khan, the two architects of Pakistani military alliance membership. Thus by the time the Eisenhower administration took office, it was clear that Pakistan's short-lived policy of non-involvement in the East-West Cold War, a policy initiated by Jinnah and followed by Liaquat Ali Khan up to 1950, was coming to an end along with the American policy of non-involvement in the Indian subcontinent.

The United States and Pakistan were moving in the same direction but for entirely different reasons. While the United States was guided by its global policy of containment of international communism, Pakistan was motivated by problems of national security and defence. Thus, in American relations with the Indian subcontinent nations, a new phase that was to have a profound impact on the subcontinent had begun.

CHAPTER 3
CONTAINMENT AND PACTOMANIA
ON THE
INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
(1953-1965)

With the inauguration of General Dwight D. Eisenhower in January 1953 to the American presidency, a new phase towards the Indian subcontinent had begun. Before we examine this new phase in the historical evolution of the subcontinent, a few words must be said on the view of international communism and the concept of containment held by the Eisenhower administration.

John Foster Dulles, the newly-appointed Secretary of State, described a generally-held American view of communism when he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that communism "believes that human beings are nothing more than somewhat superior animalsand that the best kind of world is that world which is organized as a well-managed farm is organized, where certain animals are taken out to pasture, and they are fed and brought back and milked, and they are given a barn as shelter over their heads."¹ This, in essence,

¹ Quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938-1970 (Baltimore, 1971), 219.

summed up the ideology that had millions of adherents.

As to the concept of containment, both Eisenhower and Dulles during the presidential campaign thought it nothing short of being anti-American. "We can never rest," declared General Eisenhower during the presidential campaign, "until the enslaved nations of the world have in the fullness of freedom the right to choose their own path, for then, and then only, can we say that there is a possible way of living peacefully and permanently with communism in the world."²

Containment, charged Secretary Dulles, was a treadmill policy "which, at best might perhaps keep us in the same place until we drop exhausted."³ The alternative promised by Dulles was proposed in a campaign speech when he said Eisenhower, as President would use "all means to secure the liberation of Eastern Europe."⁴

² Quoted in Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, 219.

³ John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York, 1950), 243.

⁴ Dulles, War or Peace, 243.

Shortly after taking office, the president launched a reexamination of basic political-military strategy, a study that came to be known as "Operation Solarium",⁵ named for the White House sun room where it was conceived in May 1953. This involved the creation of separate task forces to examine three possible approaches: (1) Whether to continue the "containment" strategy essentially as pursued by the Truman administration; (2) whether to "draw a line" between the Soviet orbit and the "free nations", and warn the Kremlin that it ran severe risks if it dared to move across the line; or (3) whether to adopt a serious "liberation" strategy based on a vigorous program of psychological, political, economic and parliamentary measures.⁶

Upon deliberation the task force concluded that containment was perhaps the most feasible approach in American relations towards the threat of international communism. However, to containment was added the concept of "massive retaliation." In a speech given in January 1954, Secretary Dulles quoted Lenin and Stalin to show that the Soviets planned to destroy the "free world" with

5

On May 8th, 1953 President met with General Bedell Smith, Allen Dulles (CIA), C.D. Jackson and his assistant Robert Cutler to define the problem.

6

Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston, 1973), 195.

one blow. Dulles held that the United States should counter the strategy by maintaining a great strategic reserve at home and that the "free world" should be "willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing."⁷ The Eisenhower administration had made a decision "to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing."⁸

While Secretary Dulles accepted the redefined version of containment of the communist threat in Europe, he was extremely active in other parts of the world, setting out to extend the containment policy to Asia and the Middle East.

The achievement of an inconclusive truce in Korea was not followed, as might have been expected, by any disengagement from the Chinese Civil War. On the contrary, American ties with Chiang Kai-shek were strengthened and hostility was deliberately maintained towards the Peking regime which, as Dulles saw it, had committed aggression in Korea.⁹ Moreover, the Secretary of State

⁷ John Foster Dulles, "Evolution of Foreign Policy" speech to Council on Foreign Relations, January 12, 1954 (Department of State Press Release #8).

⁸ Dulles, "Evolution of Foreign Policy" speech to Council on Foreign Policy Relations (Dept. of State Press Release #8).

⁹ Gilbert, Rise to Globalism, 220.

was certain that the Peking regime would crumble and fall because of its own iniquity, just as he repeatedly assured the American public that the Soviet regime would soon be overthrown.

To hasten the collapse of the Sino-Soviet menace and, in the meantime, to prevent any further communist encroachment upon the "free world," Dulles set out to build a ring of military bases and alliances around the vast periphery of the Sino-Soviet orbit. In his own words,

The cornerstones of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defence. They clearly cannot achieve security separately. No single nation can develop for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibility. In seeking to do so, each would become a garrison state and none would achieve security. This is true of the United States. Without the cooperation of allies, we would not even be in a position to retaliate massively against the war industries of an attacking nation. That requires international facilities.¹⁰

According to Dulles, a collective defense system was to be designed in such a way that: "In every endangered area there should be a sufficient military establishment to maintain order against subversion and to resist other

10

John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 3, April 1954, 355-356.

forms of indirect aggression and minor satellite aggression."¹¹ However to achieve this objective, the United States required the co-operation of Asian countries, especially those having important strategic locations.

Pakistan as discussed in the second chapter was seen by many as a suitable location for American air bases. Being divided into two parts--western and eastern--she occupied an important strategic location. As Selig Harrison has noted "the wartime use of airstrips so close to the new Soviet industrial centres beyond the Urals has no doubt been a major consideration from the start in the Pakistani aid programme."¹² A glance at the map could show the key position of Pakistan in any scheme to extend American air bases around the southern flank of Soviet Asia. West Pakistan borders on Communist China, Afghanistan, Iran, India and only a few miles separate her from the Soviet Union. West Pakistan has control over the Khyber Pass, the key to the Indian sub-continent, and has an important position as far as communication with the oil-rich areas of the Middle East are

11

John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace", Foreign Affairs, April 1954, 356.

12

Selig S. Harrison, "India, Pakistan, and the United States, Cost of a mistake," The New Republic, Vol. 141, No. 8, 24 August 1959, 21.

concerned. As for East Pakistan, presently Bangladesh, it is nearer to Burma and hence has great significance in South East Asia as well. Thus, military bases in Pakistan could provide the United States with take-off points within striking distance of the Soviet Union's atomic plants and other war installations behind the Urals.¹³

Like the American decision-makers, the American press favoured the close alliance with the Pakistanis. The New York Times wrote on January 24, 1953:

Pakistan is a logical force with which one must reckon when the strength and stability of South Asia are under consideration. There are good reasons for this. The first is the fact that Pakistan has done a remarkable job of building itself up since the nation became independent in 1947. It is solvent; it is at work, it is free and it is determined to remain free. Pakistan is therefore, in a position of great potential strength. A second element is the interesting fact that while a part of Pakistan is closer to Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim, the country seems to face west rather than east. It is definitely a bridge. There is no better evidence of this than that Pakistan is being talked about in relations on the Middle East rather than any possible Far Eastern Association of States.....A strong Pakistan, aligned

with a vigorous Turkey and a renascent Egypt could well help to turn position of grave uncertainty into an area of solid strength for the free world.¹⁴

The U.S. News and World Report reminded its readers about the importance of having air bases in Pakistan:

As a base for strategic bombers Pakistan's air fields, modern and numerous, are within easy reach of Soviet Central Asia including the Ural and Siberian industrial areas far distant from U.S. bases in the Mediterranean and Arabia.¹⁵

On January 12, 1953, the New York Times disclosed that Secretary Dulles would visit India, Pakistan and other Asian states in the following spring. Dulles' aim as reported by the New York Times was "to determine to what extent their Governments are ready to cooperate in the new Administration's plans for a co-ordinated defence against Communist aggression in the Far East."¹⁶ In particular, he was said to be planning the extension of the Pacific military alliances to the mainland areas of Indo-China, Thailand and Malaya, a project for which the support of India and Pakistan was considered to be "particularly im-

¹⁴

The New York Times, January 24, 1953.

¹⁵

The U.S. News and World Report, Nov. 15, 1953.

¹⁶

The New York Times, January 12, 1953.

portant."¹⁷

Dulles visited India, Pakistan, and other countries in the Near East during May, and on his return reported to Washington that he had found warm friendship in Karachi and that "the strong spiritual faith and material spirit of the Pakistani people made them a dependable bulwark against Communism in Asia."¹⁸ "One of my clearest impressions was that of the outstanding and sincere friendship which the leaders of Pakistan feel for the U.S. I was greatly impressed with their understanding of world problems.....they will resist the menace of Communism as their strength permits," declared Dulles.¹⁹

About India, he said that he had not always agreed with Nehru but did clear up some misunderstanding.²⁰ Moreover, it was during this visit that the idea of a "northern tier" had developed and he held the view that indigenous forces should be built up in non-communist countries in Asia and that in such a programme Pakistan

¹⁷

The New York Times, January 12, 1953.

¹⁸

American Foreign Policy 1950-55, Basic Documents, Vol. I, U.S. State Department Publication 6446, 2172.

¹⁹

U.S. House, 83rd Congress, Committee on Agriculture Hearings, Wheat Aid to Pakistan (Washington, 1953), 6.

²⁰

U.S. House, 83rd Congress, Session, Committee on Agriculture Hearings, Wheat Aid to Pakistan (Washington, 1953), 6.

should play an important role.²¹

The visit of Vice-President Richard M. Nixon to India, Pakistan and other Asian countries developed the situation further. During his three-day stay in Karachi, in the first part of December 1953, Nixon told the Pakistanis that he was convinced that the people of Pakistan had a firm determination to thwart Communist ambitions, and that the United States would be proud to support Pakistan in industrial development and also in defence.²²

On his return the Vice-President urged that the ring around the Soviet Union be closed by creating a military crescent comprising Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Indo-China, Formosa, and Japan. He recommended military aid to Pakistan, and thought that the United States' decision on the subject must be guided by what was deemed best for America and should not be deflected by any fear of Indian reaction. Furthermore, he was believed to

21

U.S. Senate, 83rd Congress, 2nd Sess., Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Statements by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (Washington, 1954), 3-4.

22

Sinha, Pakistan and Indo-U.S. Relations, 119.

have favoured the alliance with Pakistan "as a counter-force to the confirmed neutralism of Jawaharlal Nehru's India;"²³ as his biographer observed, Nixon was "convinced that India's neutralism was an outgrowth of the Prime Minister's belief that India could be a dominant force only if the rest of the nations of non-communist Asia were weak and unarmed."²⁴

While Nixon and Dulles favoured arms aid to Pakistan, the American press and public opinion during December 1953 and January 1954 were not too sure. The Christian Science Monitor wrote:

A great wave of anti-Americanism will sweep India.....if arms go to Pakistan in an appreciable quantity or the U.S. is given bases inside that country. Such a development in turn could call forth an answering, wave of anti-Indian feeling from Americans who do not understand the natural source of India's apprehension. It might be helpful in this connection to remember that it was a Pakistani invasion of Kashmir which set in motion the events that have made the explosive political dispute so difficult of solution.²⁵

23

Ralph de Toledano, Nixon (London, 1957), 164.

24

Quoted in M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs 1954-56 (Bombay, 1964), 268.

25

The Christian Science Monitor, December 21, 1953.

Hanson Baldwin, the military correspondent of the New York Times wrote: "Military aid to Pakistan could mean the beginning of a viable Middle East defence, and a new and more direct and vigorous approach to all the problems of the Indian subcontinent and of Southeast Asia."²⁶ Selig Harrison wrote: "India is the great power of South Asia, it is not the business of the United States to subsidize Pakistan as a permanent garrison state with a military capability swollen out of all proportion to her size. The Eisenhower administration influenced by Pentagon Generals, made a mistake by helping Pak defence aid."²⁷

While the press deliberated on the pros and cons of the aid to Pakistan, the bureaucrats in Washington urged the delivery of military aid. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African affairs, George Allen, argued that it was not in the U.S. interest to break an alliance with the country which had placed itself publicly on record with the U.S.²⁸

26

The New York Times, December 20, 1953.

27

Quoted by Sayeed, Khalid, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests," Asian Survey, No. 3, March 1964, 754.

28

U.S. House, 83rd Congress, 2nd Sess., Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, The Mutual Security Act of 1954 (Washington, 1954), 509-11.

He added that Pakistan was strategically located with good manpower and thus had all the desired requirements for a prompt Pakistan-U.S. alliance.²⁹ The Director of the Mutual Security Administration, Harold Stassen, viewed it with a different approach when he said: "We feel that Pakistan may well become a second Turkey. They are a stalwart people and will provide another anchor in the Near East.....it may be a slow process, things might upset there, but that is the direction in which we are working."³⁰

The "direction" in which American foreign policy was evolving was that of containing the spread of international communism, but under the Eisenhower administration containment was to be done through the building of alliances on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet borders.

Without doubt Nixon's strong pleas on his return from Pakistan helped "tip Administration scales in favour of (the) arms pact."³¹ It was in this context of newly-

²⁹. U.S. House, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, The Mutual Security Act of 1954, (Washington, 1954), 509-11.

³⁰ U.S. House, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess., Sub-Committee of the Committee on Appropriation Hearings, Mutual Security Appropriations for 1955 (Washington, 1954), 17.

³¹ Toledano, Nixon, 164.

emerged goodwill with the United States that Pakistan urged for military aid. Mohammed Ali Bogra, the ex-Ambassador to Washington and now Prime Minister of Pakistan disclosed this development in a press conference on February 22, 1954.³² Only two days later President Eisenhower in a letter to Prime Minister Nehru acknowledged that the United States was complying with a request from Pakistan for military aid and he further wrote:

What we are proposing to do, and what Pakistan is agreeing to, is not directed in any way against India. And I am confirming publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan is misused and directed against another in aggression, I will undertake immediately, in accordance with my constitutional authority appropriate action both within and without the UN to thwart such aggression.³³

With this assurance to the Indian Prime Minister, the United States went ahead and signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with Pakistan on May 19, 1954.³⁴ In the agreement the two governments affirmed their adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and agreed that their

³² The Dawn, February 23, 1954. Also quoted in Janki Sinha, Pakistan and the Indo-US Relations 1947-58 (Patna, 1978), 119.

³³ U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy 1950-55: Basic Documents, Vol. I (Washington, 1957), 2192.

³⁴ Janki Sinha, Pakistan and the Indo-US Relations, 119.

participation in individual and collective self-defence was in conformity with the Charter. The agreement provided that Pakistan would use that assistance exclusively to maintain internal security arrangements and measures, and she would not, without the prior agreement of the Government of the United States, devote such assistance to any purpose other than those for which it was furnished.³⁵ In essence, the United States regarded the military aid to Pakistan as a prelude to bringing her under a more definite and specific regional alliance to be formed to contain communism in Asia. As Selig Harrison has written, "any judgement on the decision to give military aid to Pakistan is in effect a broader judgement on the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Baghdad Pact and indeed the entire Dulles policy outside Europe."³⁶

The condemnation of the American-Pakistan alliance was not long in coming. Many influential Americans questioned the administration policy towards the Indian

35

Sinha, Pakistan and Indo-U.S. Relations, 119.

36

Harrison, "India, Pakistan and the U.S.," The New Republic, 21.

subcontinent. Chester Bowles, the American Ambassador to India, fought the United States' aid decision to Pakistan until he was replaced by the Eisenhower appointee, George V. Allen. In a letter to Secretary Dulles, Bowles declared:

I am convinced that the proposed United States-Pakistan military agreement may indeed set in motion a chain of events which in the next ten years can lead to political developments in India and South Asia which will have grave implications for our future relations in this area and indeed in all of Asia.³⁷

George Allen, the Eisenhower appointee to New Delhi, testifying to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives stated: "There is one issue upon which perhaps ninety-five per cent or more of the Indians are united in opposition of the United States.....It is the question of military aid to Pakistan. On that question they are all against the U.S."³⁸ Senator William J. Fulbright of Arkansas was of the view that the grant of military aid to Pakistan in the context of intense rivalry

³⁷

Bowles, Promises to Keep (New York, 1971), 479.

³⁸

U.S. House, 83rd Congress, 2nd Sess., Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, The Mutual Security Act of 1954 (Washington, 1954), 330.

between India and Pakistan would aggravate their problems and hence fail to bring any good for the United States.

Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 2, 1954, he declared:

I think the decision to supply arms to Pakistan is an unfortunate mistake..... I have the greatest respect for the people of Pakistan as I do for the people of India. Their mutual difficulties have threatened war, so we are not unaware of the tension between them and therefore, should have been extremely careful in our relations with them.³⁹

Ignoring the criticism, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, responded by arguing that "our aid to Pakistan is fully justified. We have in Pakistan a very fine loyal anti-communist ally."⁴⁰ Justifying the decision to provide military aid to Pakistan in the interest of American global strategy, Henry Kissinger observed:

We cannot permit the balance of power to be overturned for the sake of allied unity or the approbation of the uncommitted, for

³⁹ Congressional Record, (U.S.), Vol. 100 (Washington, 1954), 2481.

⁴⁰ U.S. Senate, 84th Congress, 2nd Sess., Comm. on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Mutual Security Act of 1956 (Washington, 1956), 594. See also Sinha, Pakistan, 122.

the condition of any future co-operation with them is the maintenance of a strategic balance between us and the Soviet Union.⁴¹

While the American government and its supporters justified their decision to provide military aid to Pakistan on the grounds that it would help contain communism, the Indian government wasted no time in denouncing the action. Prime Minister Nehru declared that it was the system of forging alliance which made the area of the cold war enlarged and perilous.⁴² Keeping this view he decided to continue to follow the policy of non-alignment. This policy had the advantage of localising and limiting the area of the cold war. However, any substantial success could be achieved only when other neighbouring countries of India also followed the same policy. Therefore, Nehru earnestly appealed to them to follow his lead:

I should like the countries in Asia
.....and other countries also to make
it clear to those great countries that
are so explosively bitter against each
other that they themselves will remain
cool and not enter the arena of warfare
whatever happens and they will try at
least to restrict the area of conflict,

41

Henry Kissinger, Nuclear, Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, 1957), 264.

42

Sinha, Pakistan, 123.

save their own regions and try to save the rest as best they can.⁴³

However, the Pakistani-American alliance presented a variety of consequences for India. The pact between the two countries tended to disturb the balance of power throughout Southeast Asia and add to the difficulty of restoring friendly relations between India and Pakistan. The projected increase of Pakistan's armed forces from less than 250,000 to one million by means of an American subsidy of about \$250 million, forecast in the American press, would force India to match Pakistan at a great expense or be regulated to a secondary position.⁴⁴

While American decision-makers protested that the pact was not directed against India, the New York Times correspondent in Karachi wrote on November 22, 1953:

Actually Pakistan is more inclined to build her military strength as a bargaining factor in dealing with India on the Kashmir issue than as a defence against other countries, including the Soviet Union. This is a common admission privately expressed.⁴⁵

⁴³

Nehru, Speeches, 1949-53, 215.

⁴⁴

M.S. Rajan, India in World Affairs 1954-56, 203.

⁴⁵

The New York Times, November 22, 1953.

Thus, American negotiations and the eventual military aid agreement with Pakistan immediately resulted in a deterioration of Indo-Pakistani relations, particularly in relation to the Kashmir question. It was in August 1953 that the Prime Ministers of both India and Pakistan had reached an agreement on a plebiscite for the disputed province of Jammu and Kashmir.⁴⁶ A plebiscite administrator was scheduled to be appointed by the end of April 1954 to conduct the impartial vote.⁴⁷ However, the grant of military aid to Pakistan changed the whole context of the Kashmir question and made the demilitarization of Kashmir in consonance with the previous agreements absurd, for Pakistan with added strength could at any time invade demilitarized Kashmir, as she had done in 1947. The military aid to Pakistan in the words of Nehru was "a qualitative change" which adversely affected "Indo-Pakistan relations, and more especially the Kashmir problem."⁴⁸

⁴⁶ India, White Paper on Kashmir 1953-54, 7.

⁴⁷ India, White Paper on Kashmir, 7.

⁴⁸ India, White Paper on Kashmir, 58. Also quoted in Sangat Singh, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal (Bombay, 1970), 87.

While the Kashmir problem was to remain in a stalemate from 1954 on, the chance of an East-West conflict also worried the Indian leaders. The result of the alliance between Washington and Karachi brought the grave risk of war closer to India. As Nehru told the Council of States on December 24, 1953:

It means that the Cold War, as it is called, will come to Pakistan, come to India's border from the west and from the east--both sides. It means that if the other shooting war develops, it will also come right up to the borders of India.⁴⁹

In another speech to the House of the People, the Prime Minister pointed out the grave concern of India over the alliance by declaring:

Their implications impinge on the newly won and cherished independence of Asian countries. The maintenance of independence and sovereignty of Asian countries as well as the end of colonial and foreign rule is essential to the prosperity of Asian peoples as well as for the peace of the world. We do not seek any special role in Asia, nor do we champion any narrow and sectional Asian regionalism. We only seek to keep for ourselves and the adherence of others, particularly our neighbours to a peace area and to a policy of non-alignment and non-commitment to world tensions and wars. This, we believe, is essential to us for our own sake and can

49

Quoted in Natarajan, American Shadow Over India, 146.

alone enable us to make our contribution to lowering world tensions, to furthering disarmaments and to world peace.⁵⁰

Nehru went on to add that "the present developments, however, cast a deep shadow on our hopes, they impinge on our basic policies and they seek to contain us in alignments." In the same statement he emphasized the fact that the announcement of the proposal to set up the South East Asian Treaty had been preceded by statements "which came near to assuming protection, or declaring a kind of Monroe Doctrine, unilaterally, over the countries of South East Asia."⁵¹

The United States, however, thought otherwise. She became interested in having such an alliance because of the outbreak of the Korean conflict which provoked the problem of meeting the communist challenge in South East Asia. According to Secretary Dulles, perhaps the most ardent supporter of the alliance;

Under the conditions of today, the imposition of South East Asia of the political system of communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means would be

⁵⁰
House of People (April 24, 1954), Part II, Vol. IV, No. 52, 558-81.

⁵¹
House of People (April 24, 1954), 5581.

a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that possibility should not be passively accepted, but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now, if we dare not be resolute today.⁵²

Dulles went ahead with plans for "united action" to block further communist gains in Southeast Asia. On September 2, 1954, he met with the representatives of Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan in the Philippine capital of Manila.⁵³ Although invited, India, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia declined to attend the conference, preferring to follow their common policy of noninvolvement in the cold war. Therefore, only three Asian countries were present. In a speech given on September 6 in Manila, Dulles declared:

The United States has itself no direct territorial interests in South East Asia. Nevertheless, we feel a sense of common destiny with those who have in this area their life and being.

We are united by a common danger, the danger that stems from International Com-

52

Department of State Bulletin, XXX (772), April 12, 1954, 540.

53

R.C. Gupta, U.S. Policy Towards India Pakistan (Delhi, 1977), 10.

munism and its insatiable ambition. We know that whenever it makes gains, as in Indo-China, these gains are looked on, not as final solutions, but as bridgeheads for future gains.⁵⁴

The "common destiny" emphasized by Secretary Dulles was, however, only shared by three nations of South-east Asia, which made up less than half the countries and less than a quarter of the people in the region which it originally intended to defend. On September 8th, the delegates signed an alliance called the Southeast Asia Treaty or Manila Pact.⁵⁵ It stipulated that each signatory would recognize an attack on any one of them as endangering its own peace and safety. Each agreed to act according to its constitutional process.

The Manila Pact or SEATO made no provision for any standing armed forces. The parties agreed to develop their capacity "to resist armed attack and to prevent any counter subversive activities directed from without" (Article II), and to co-operate to promote economic progress and social well-being (Article III). However if the

54

Department of State Bulletin, XXXI (795), September 20, 1954, 391.

55

For Text of Manila Pact or SEATO and the Pacific Charter see George Modelski, SEATO, 289.

threat was other than armed attack, the parties would "consult immediately" to agree on measures for common defence (Article IV, 1, 2).⁵⁶ The protocol to the treaty designated Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam as the states to whom Article III and IV would be applicable.⁵⁷

However SEATO did not shape up as a strong shield against armed attack. As none of the major powers which belonged to it had their homelands in the SEATO area, the treaty did not stipulate--as NATO did--that an attack against any member would be considered an attack against all, calling for instant action. In essence, the United States was against setting up any joint military command. Secretary Dulles stated in Manila that the United States' responsibilities were so vast and so far-flung that she could "serve best, not by earmarking forces for particular areas of the Far East, but by developing the deterrent of mobile striking power, plus strategically placed reserves."⁵⁸

Pakistan had good reasons to feel dissatisfied with SEATO. It was made clear that she would receive no

⁵⁶ Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 166.

⁵⁷ Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 166.

⁵⁸ Quoted in Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 167.

armed assistance from SEATO against an Indian attack, which was her most immediate concern. The United States wrote a reservation into the treaty, that her obligation under Article IV, paragraph 1, would extend only to cases of communist aggression; the Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafrulla Ali Khan argued valiantly that "all aggression is evil,"⁵⁹ but he was unable to prevent the United States from entering this condition. Australia and New Zealand publicly declared that they did not regard themselves bound by SEATO to take military action against any fellow member of the Commonwealth.⁶⁰ Britain did not make any similar statement publicly but no one had any doubt that her position was any different. That left France, the Philippines, and Thailand, and it was inconceivable that they would fight for Pakistan against India while the United States and the three Commonwealth countries stood aside.

India, nevertheless, was directly affected by SEATO because she came under the "treaty area" of the pact, as well as the fact that a none-too-friendly Pakistan

59

Quoted in Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 167.

60

Ralph Braibanti, International Implications of the Manila Pact, 21-3.

was one of its members. The common belief in India was that the only reason for Pakistan's joining the pact was her hostility towards India. It became more obvious when the Pakistani Foreign Minister emphasized the point that the pact was aimed at "aggression" from whichever quarter, i.e., not merely from the communist quarter--it might proceed in a region where "aggression has unhappily been a common experience during the past many years."⁶¹

While the SEATO alliance was designed to check Communist China's advance into Southeast Asia, the Baghdad Pact was initiated and encouraged by the United States to resist threat of Soviet expansion in the Middle Eastern countries. The United States did not join it but her active involvement in the formation of the Baghdad Pact with Pakistani membership was openly proclaimed. This was because she did not wish to (1) touch off a conflict with the Soviet Union; (2) displease Israel, to which she had been giving her support; and (3) annoy Saudi Arabia, with which she had a special relationship.⁶²

⁶¹

The Hindu, September 9, 1954.

⁶²

S.C. Tewari, Indo-U.S. Relations 1947-76 (New Delhi, 1977), 88.

The United States, however, joined the Economic and Counter-Subversion Committee of the Pact in 1956 under pressure from other members. She also sent observers to the meeting of the Pact.

By forming the Baghdad Pact, the United States filled the gap between NATO and SEATO. It created alliances all around the Communist camp from Western Europe to the Philippines covering both the Soviet Union and Communist China. The chief aim of the Baghdad Pact was to counter the Soviet threat in the countries of the Middle East.

After the Second World War, the increase in Middle East oil production made the area more important. Geographically, the region lies astride the routes of South Asia and Africa. In wartime its control by the Soviet Union would outflank NATO, and its use by the western countries would provide a useful springboard for an assault on the Soviet Union over a wide front. Britain, which had traditionally barred the Russian advance towards India, was too weak after the Second World War to checkmate Soviet moves single-handedly. As early as 1951-52 there were talks first about the establishment of a Middle East Command sponsored by the United States, Britain, France, and Turkey, and then of a Middle East Defence

Organization (MEDO).⁶³

Both schemes, however, failed, principally because they did not attract the Near Eastern countries of the region on whose membership these arrangements were to be based. The Arab states were too preoccupied with their conflict with Israel while Egypt and Iran had unsettled disputes with Britain about the Suez base and oil respectively.⁶⁴

However, in 1954, the question of Middle East defence grew in urgency because Britain had abandoned the Suez base in October and the Anglo-Iran Treaty of 1930 was about to expire. After the fall of Premier Mosaddeq in 1953, the Shah of Iran began to incline towards alignment with the U.S. led bloc.⁶⁵ Dulles, therefore, persuaded Turkey and Pakistan to sign a treaty of mutual defence in April 1954.⁶⁶ Iraq and Turkey signed a Pact of Mutual Assistance in Baghdad on February 24, 1955.⁶⁷

⁶³ ,

Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 169.

⁶⁴

Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 169.

⁶⁵

Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 169.

⁶⁶

Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 170.

⁶⁷

Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 170.

Britain joined the Baghdad Pact on April 5th; Pakistan on September 23rd; and Iran on November 3rd.⁶⁸

The Baghdad Pact stipulated that "the high contracting parties will co-operate for their security and defence,"⁶⁹ but that such measures as they agree to take "may form the subject of special agreements with each other" (Article I).⁷⁰ Also, that "this pact shall be open for accession to any member State of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognized by both the high contracting parties."⁷¹

However after the July 1958 revolution, Iraq ceased to participate in pact activities; in October the headquarters were moved to Ankara; in March 1959 Iraq formally relinquished her membership; and in August the name of the organization was changed to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).⁷²

68

Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 170.

69

Quoted in Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 170.

70

Quoted in Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 170.

71

Quoted in Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, 170.

72

Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (London, 1968), 136.

United States-sponsored regional alliances like CENTO and SEATO represented a logical follow-up of the policy behind military aid. Therefore, Indian reaction against the membership of Pakistan in these alliances was naturally bitter. At the creation of SEATO, Nehru had said, "Positively it has little contribution to make (to security). Negatively it has definitely added to the tensions and fears of the situation."⁷³ He voiced the same strong opposition to the Baghdad Pact. In Nehru's words, "any approach by military pact like the Baghdad Pact and SEATO was a wrong approach. It was a dangerous approach which set in motion all the wrong tendencies and prevented the right intimately and in a sense tended to encircle us from two or three directions."⁷⁴

Although India was by far the larger country in size and population in comparison to Pakistan, the United States by the massive induction of modern and sophisticated weaponry to her new ally, altered the balance of power in South Asia. The Indians were obviously seri-

73

House of People Debates, vol. 7, part II, 29 Sept. 1954, 3677.

74

House of People Debates, Vol. 7, part II, March 28, 1956, 43.

ously concerned but the United States administration, in the words of Deputy Under Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon, felt in 1958 that they were "unduly alarmed by this. They seem to think that we have sent and are sending more military equipment to Pakistan than we actually are. We have been doing our best to disabuse them of this."⁷⁵

However, if this was the case in 1958, it was no longer true by 1965 when the Indo-Pakistan war broke out. Between 1954 and 1965, the United States gave Pakistan military assistance in grant form to the tune of \$1.4 billion, roughly half of which was in military hardware and the other half in supporting assistance.⁷⁶

Even though the Indian army seemed large in size, Pakistan had a clear technological superiority over India. Some of the sophisticated weaponry--such as supersonic F-104 aircraft and F-86 Sabre jets with sidewinder missiles, and submarines--was introduced into the subcontinent for the first time through American military aid to Pakistan.⁷⁷ According to Ambassador Bowles:

⁷⁵

Nayer, American Geopolitics and India, 74-5.

⁷⁶

Nayer, American Geopolitics and India, 75.

⁷⁷

Nayer, American Geopolitics and India, 75.

The Indian Government pointed out that the military equipment that we are giving to Pakistan had no relevance to our alleged military objectives. If the Pakistan Army were actually designed to become part of a U.S.-Chinese military movement through the Himalayas or the Hindu Kush Mountains, it would be seeking equipment appropriate for fighting in the mountain areas. However, the equipment we supplied Pakistan -- tanks, motorized artillery and the like -- was suitable for use only on a relatively flat terrain, in other words, on the plains of North India. Moreover, from the outset the Pakistan Government had itself made clear that it had no quarrel with either the U.S.S.R. or China and privately admitted that its military build-up was, in fact directed against India.⁷⁸

The Indians not only faced a technologically superior enemy, but also one who had taken the initiative in the 1965 war. William J. Barnds, in his book India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers declared that it was "a surprise to most western observers, who had rated the army's capabilities highly,"⁷⁹ that Pakistan's army failed to become effective in the theatre of operations during the 1965 war. The London Times wrote that the guerrilla action in Indian Kashmir had resulted from infiltration from the Pakistan side. The paper held the Pakistan govern-

78

Bowles, Promises to Keep, 480.

79

William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York, 1972), 204.

ment responsible for planning and directing the operation.⁸⁰

The Washington Post said,

...but if communism was the enemy in Dulles' mind--India was the real enemy in Pakistani mind. Arms from the United States to stand guard against the Soviet Union are being used against India as Indians always contended they would be ...Cento Pact thus has lost completely its original meaning.⁸¹

In short, according to The Post, Pakistan was following what "it considers its own national interest, and focal point of that policy is hostility towards India not towards communism as Dulles had hoped."⁸² The Post Intelligencer of Seattle wrote,

The flood of arms into Pakistan made war with India almost inevitable, just as the shipments of arms to Latin American countries has given the generals the means of staging revolution after revolution....The inescapable fact is that the U.S. policy of building up the military might of Pakistan has not worked. It has caused war with India. And the name of the United States today is mud in both countries.⁸³

80

The Times (London), September 23, 1965.

81

The Washington Post, September 9, 1965.

82

The Washington Post, September 9, 1965.

83

The Post Intelligencer Seattle, September 11, 1965.

A British newspaper, The Birmingham Post observed:

Had India waited longer, Pakistan's army, equipped with American Patton tanks and F-104 Aircraft would have reached JammuIndia could not sit with folded hands and watch this third unprovoked aggression by Pakistan on her territory in the last 18 years....India acted with great restraint and in self-defence in an effort to bring about cessation of Pakistani aggression.⁸⁴

While the western press was fair in its treatment of the Indo-Pakistan War, India, nevertheless, was distressed at the lack of any public rebuke of Pakistan concerning the use of American arms against her, despite all the earlier assurances by Eisenhower and Dulles. One could argue that had the United States taken a stern position on the question of Pakistan's employment of American arms in the earlier encounter in the Ram of Kutch, the September 1965 war might have been prevented. However, American decision-makers sought to confuse the issue by the notion that the Indians too might have used American arms provided to them for use only against Communist China. The American diplomatic mission in New Delhi, after a careful inquiry, "reached the conclusion that the only Indian units in the area armed with U.S. weapons were two

reserve mountain divisions which were not involved in combat."⁸⁵

The massive supply of American weapons to Pakistan needs to be contrasted with the lukewarm American attitude in the supply of military equipment to India after her confrontation with Communist China in 1962. There was, to be sure, an instinctive response by the United States and other western countries to send emergency shipments of immediately needed arms, and there was an equivalent massive emotional upsurge of appreciation within India.⁸⁶ However, as soon as the conflict was over, the United States struck a different posture. In the words of Ambassador Bowles, the United States "seized upon India's acute need for U.S. assistance as a lever to force the Indians to make concessions to the Pakistani in regard to Kashmir, which no democratic Indian Government could make and survive."⁸⁷ The Ambassador further added that top officials of the State and Defence Department, including Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara, were "strongly opposed to

⁸⁵ Bowles, Promises to Keep, 504.

⁸⁶ Nayer, American Geopolitics and India, 76.

⁸⁷ Bowles, Promises to Keep, 439.

a five-year programme to help modernize the Indian armed forces, largely on the grounds that it would disrupt our relations with Pakistan."⁸⁸

However beyond the question of unsettling relations with Pakistan and the possible threat to the American base in Peshawar, from where the ill-fated U-2 plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers had taken off,⁸⁹ the possible supply of American arms to India was made conditional on a prior Indian commitment to a generalized opposition to communism. In essence, this would have set India against not just Communist China but the Soviet Union as well, and thus would have required Indian collaboration in other areas of the world in containing communism.

This would, in effect, have required India to end the policy of non-alignment and would have turned her into a satellite of the United States--a position that was unacceptable to Indian leaders. In the words of William Barnds, "those who had helped to draw India into closer relations as a means of containing Chinese power in Asia saw less chance

88

Bowles, Promises to Keep, 439.

89

Palmer, South Asia and the U.S., 33.

of this," and he concludes:

India had long been dubious about U.S. policies in South-East Asia, and while it was worried about Chinese activities there, it was unwilling to co-operate with the United States on an anti-communist policy that would bring dissension with the U.S.S.R.⁹⁰

90

Barnds, India, Pakistan and Great Powers, 195.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

When India achieved independence in August 1947, she did so as two separate countries. The larger secular state became the Republic of India and the smaller one, the Moslem nation of Pakistan. They followed different paths in relations with the United States. Pakistan aligned herself closely with American foreign policy, whereas India chose an independent course in world affairs. India took a neutralist position in the cold war, shunning alliances with either the communist bloc or the United States.

Thus when the cold war was extended in the early 1950's from Europe to larger international fronts, the initial American response was to organize a series of alliances modeled on the successful NATO alliance in Europe. The inadequacies of this policy as a means for organizing an effective anti-communist coalition are by now widely understood. However, there is a further and less well understood point that needs to be made about alliances. The Asian alliances of the United States in the 1950's furnished the United States with the initial commitments that were to affect the internal affairs of the countries in these regions. These treaties were the vehicles for an involvement which came to extend not only

to advise and aid in military organization and strategy but in the employment of police, the use of domestic propaganda and indoctrination, the employment of economic aid, and on methods of domestic finance and trade. Yet there is imposing evidence that this kind of detailed involvement--this benign intervention, to say nothing of the military interventions which the alliance implies--in fact damages the legitimacy and autonomy of the American allies, and thus damages their purported interests as well as real ones.

NATO--the prototype alliance of modern American foreign policy--sprang from reality. Perhaps the West overestimated the imminence of the Soviet threat in 1949, but the impulse to defend Europe stemmed from a perception of threat which the Americans and the Europeans shared; and the threat was real. CENTO--the Baghdad Alliance--was another matter. It purported to unite the "Northern Tier" of anti-communist states in the Middle East--Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan--and may have been important to two of these states, Turkey and Iran, both of which had been threatened at the war's close by direct Soviet territorial demands. The alliance was not only useless to Iraq and Pakistan, but from the standpoint of their national interests, may have been positively injurious. A territorial guarantee of these states against Soviet invasion might have been relevant but American diplomats

wanted more--alliance and political association, including frequent public reassurances of anti-communism and pro-Americanism.. In the event, as the overthrow of the Nuri-es-Said regime in 1958 demonstrated (as well as the success of subsequent Iraqi regimes in excluding communism), American stewardship in Iraq was both unable to assure political stability and unnecessary to exclude communism.

In Pakistan the attention of the country was fixed on the issue of the frontier with India, particularly in the disputed territory of Kashmir. What Americans constructed as an anti-communist alliance against the threat from the north, the Pakistanis hoped to exploit as a means of achieving American backing for their claims in Kashmir against a neutralist India. The result was that Pakistan gained little from CENTO. (except the arms it used against India in 1965). The United States gained only reproaches--and the embarrassment of having supplied the munitions for a war against another friendly state. The United States demonstrated as well that it is neither a good friend nor a loyal ally where its own contrary interests are at stake. The American interest in the Indian subcontinent is in peace and the exclusion of Soviet power, and with little else.

Thus when China went communist in 1949, the United States felt the need for another strong power in the region to help contain the expansion of Communism in

South and Southeast Asia. The first choice was India but reluctance on the part of the Indian government to join the American-led anti-communist crusade disappointed the American efforts in the establishment of the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Pact. The opposition flowed from India's rejection of the very concept of regional military alliances.

The question of American military bases also found support in Pakistan. The United States wanted to establish military bases near the frontiers of China and the Soviet Union. While Pakistan was willing to allow her territory for such military bases, India regarded the setting up of foreign military bases, on her soil, as inconsistent with her newly gained independence.

Nevertheless, shortly after the inauguration of of the policy of containment, the United States launched a program of economic aid for India in order initially "to win friends and influence people" and later to sustain India in larger containment aimed at China. Moreover, the United States refused to provide such aid as would help first in the economic and later in the military sphere as well, even when India was confronted by a security threat from China, the supposedly ideological antagonist of the United States. At the same time, the United States endeavoured to use economic aid as a lever to influence India's foreign policy. The aid thus provided by the

United States, however, could not bring about a change in the basic policy of non-alignment for India.¹

The Indian government was basically against the formation of military pacts and alliances. The United States on the other hand followed a policy of building military pacts to contain communism. India also expressed her criticism of the American efforts to have Pakistan join her military blocs. India also opposed the American government.² India's leaders, notably Prime Minister Nehru, disliked American obsession with the cold war. He considered the emergence of India to a prominent position in world affairs more important.

However, the Truman administration insisted on the importance of the East-West struggle. Chester Bowles noted:

It is the broad area of communism, world politics and the cold war that differences between Nehru and his critics become sharpest. Unlike his clear understanding of the threat of domestic communism to democracy in India, he does not fully appreciate the nature of aggressive Soviet and Chinese communism to peace in the world.³

¹ B. Nayer, American Geopolitics and India, 229.

² S.C. Tewari, Indo-U.S. Relations, 1947-76, 141.

³ Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep, 359.

In essence, the Truman administration was surprised that Nehru had not drawn the conclusion that the world must finally choose up sides. On the other hand, Nehru felt that there was no need to take sides on a moral basis because the cold war divisions were based on expediency and calculation of national interest. Nehru also saw United States anti-communism as facilitating the extension of United States power throughout the world. A difference between United States and Indian views on the strategy needed to stabilize the Asian balance centered also on the nature of Sino-Soviet competition ought to be seen as a global one requiring an external response to China and Soviet Russia based on a philosophy of anti-communism. On the other hand, Nehru and others argued that there was a competition between two different political and social systems but the competition was internal and could be resolved by altering the internal socio-economic dynamics which encouraged or discouraged communism. In other words, the Truman thesis was based on a premise that Sino-Indian competition would result in a military confrontation and that the proper strategy was to adhere to United States containment doctrine.

Truman spoke in terms of an "either/or" proposition; on the other hand, India's foreign policy rejected the doctrine of containment of communism through military means but not necessarily through diplomatic means. The

Truman administration noted that Sino-Soviet bloc was closer than Nehru recognized. On the other hand, Nehru said that American foreign policy was based on a series of assumptions which were at best questionable and at worst dangerously wrong. Of these the most worrisome was the conviction of the United States that the primary security was a world-wide communist conspiracy in which the Soviet Union and China were closely cooperating. The primary world-wide political force, in Nehru's view, was, not communism but an intense nationalism.

However, the most important factor forcing a change of policy and strategy in South and South East Asia was the aggression in Korea in June 1950, a few months after the Soviets had exploded an atom bomb. This led to a tremendous change in American attitude towards Asia. American planners assumed that the "free world" had a limited and fairly specific period of time to erect its defences in Asia before the adversary reached the peak of its power.

Therefore, a search for allies in Asia was immediately made. As stated earlier, the United States was more inclined to depend on India rather than on Pakistan for the protection of her developing interests in South and South East Asia. To a large extent, this appeared to be the only sensible approach to many Americans. Pakistan was a much smaller country than India in

terms of size, population, economic resources and general development. Pakistan leaders were also less known in America. The views of these leaders on crucial problems that Pakistan faced were in a process of evolution.

As K.K. Paul has written in his U.S.A. and the Hindustan Peninsula, "an element of irony, even if paradox, is in-built in the study of U.S. foreign policy in the Indian subcontinent." India, with her parliamentary form of government, based on the British and American constitutional patterns and precedents, should have ab initio closely collaborated with American world aims.⁴ The American strategy to contain communism which touched India's borders, however, made the two great democracies adopt contrary attitudes on world problems.

⁴ K.K. Paul, U.S.A. and the Hindustan Peninsula, 1952-66 (New Delhi, 1976), 147.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Government Documents

American Foreign Policy 1950-55, Basic Documents, Vol. I,
United States State Department Publication 6446.

Congressional Record (U.S.), Vol. 96 (1950).

Congressional Record (U.S.), Vol. 100 (1954).

Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1947.

Department of State Bulletin, April 12, 1954.

Department of State Bulletin, September 20, 1954.

Documents on American Foreign Relations 1945-46.

Documents on American Foreign Relations 1950.

Dulles, John Foster. "Evolution of Foreign Policy" speech
to Council on Foreign Relations, January 12, 1954.
Department of State Press release #8.

India, White Paper on Kashmir 1953-54.

House of People. Part II, Vol. IV, No. 52, April 24, 1954.

House of People Debates. Vol. VII, Part II, September 29,
1954.

House of People Debates, March 28, 1956.

UN Security Council Resolution S/1501, June 25, 1950.

UN Security Council Resolution S/1511, June 27, 1950.

U.S. House, 83rd Congress, Committee on Agriculture Hearings.
Wheat Aid to Pakistan. Washington, 1953.

U.S. House, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Committee on Foreign
Affairs. Hearings, The Mutual Security Act of 1954,
Washington, 1954.

U.S. House, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session. Sub-committee of
the Committee on Appropriation Hearings, Mutual Security
Act of 1955, Washington, 1954.

U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defence. Armed Forces Information and Education Division, Armed Forces Talk No. 391, India-Oriental "Third Force," November 16, 1951.

U.S. Senate, 83rd Congress. 2nd Session. Washington, 1954.

U.S. Senate, 84th Congress. 2nd Session. Washington, 1954.

II. Books

Ambrose, Stephen. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy 1938-1970. Baltimore, 1975.

Bailey, Thomas. A Diplomatic History of the American People. New York, 1964.

Barnds, William J. India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers. New York, 1972.

Bowles, Chester. Ambassador's Report. New York, 1954.

_____, A View from New Delhi: Selected Speeches and Writings, 1963-69. Bombay, 1969.

_____, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-69. New York, 1971.

Brecher, Michael. Jawaharlal Nehru: A Political Biography. London, 1959.

Bright, J.S. ed., Important Speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. II, 1946-51, New Delhi, 1951.

Brines, Russell. The Indo-Pakistan Conflict. London, 1968.

Brown, Colin and Mooney, Peter. Cold War to Detente. London, 1978.

Brown, William Norman. The United States and India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Cambridge, Mass., 1972.

Burke, S.M. Pakistan's Foreign Policy. London, 1973.

_____, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistan Foreign Policies. Minneapolis, 1974.

Brailbanti, Ralph. International Implications of the Manila Pact. New York, 1958.

Cambell, John C. and the Research Staff of the Council on Foreign Relations. The United States in World Affairs 1947-48. New York, 1948.

Caroe, Sir Olaf. Wells of Power. London, 1951.

Clay, Lucius D. Decision in Germany. Westport, Conn., 1950.

DeConde, Alexander. A History of American Foreign Policy. Vol. II, New York, 1978.

Dulles, John Foster. War or Peace. New York, 1957.

Galbraith, John Kenneth. Ambassador's Journal. London, 1969.

Gupta, R.C. U.S. Policy Towards India Pakistan. Delhi, 1977.

Halle, Louis J. The Cold War as History. London, 1967.

Hoopes, Townsend. The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston, 1973.

Harrison, Selig S. India and the United States. New York, 1961.

Jones, Joseph M. The Fifteen Weeks. New York, 1955.

Kaul, K.K. U.S.A. and the Hindustan Peninsula 1952-1966. New Delhi, 1976.

Khan, Liaquat Ali. Pakistan: The Heart of Asia. Cambridge, 1950.

Karunakaran, K.P. India in World Affairs, 1947-50. Bombay, 1950.

Kennan, George F. Memoirs. New York, 1963.

Kissinger, Henry. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York, 1957.

Kundra, J.C. Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54. Bombay, 1955.

Kunhi Krishnan, T.V. Unfriendly Friends: India and America. New Delhi, 1974.

Lamb, B. India: A World in Transition. New York, 1963.

Lenin, V. Collected Works. Vol. XXV.

Modelski, George. SEATO. Melbourne, 1962.

Natrajan, L. American Shadow Over India. Bombay, 1952.

Nayer, Baldev R. American Geopolitics and India.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches. New York, 1950.

_____, Press Conferences. New Delhi, 1954.

_____, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches September 1946 to April 1961. Delhi, 1961.

_____, Speeches, 1946-1963. 4 Vols. 1964.

Palmer, Norman D. South Asia and U.S. Policy. New York, 1966.

Poplai, Sunder Lal and Talbot, Philip. India and America: A Study of their Relations. New Delhi, 1958.

Price, Harry Bagard. The Marshall Plan and its Meaning. New York, 1955.

Rajan, M.S. India in World Affairs: 1954-56. Bombay, 1964.

Rees, David. The Age of Containment: The Cold War 1945-1955. Washington, 1956.

Rosinger, L. India and the United States: Political and Economic Relations. New York, 1950.

Sarwar, Hasan K. Pakistan and the United States. New York, 1960.

Singh, Sangat. Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal. Bombay, 1970.

- Sinha, Janki. Pakistan and Indo-U.S. Relations. Patna, 1978.
- Shean, Vincent. Nehru: The Years of Power. New York, 1960.
- Tewari, S.C. Indo-U.S. Relations, 1947-76. New Delhi, 1977.
- Toledano, Robert de. Nixon. New York, 1956.
- Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. Vol. II. Washington, 1959.

III. Articles

- Allen, George V. "American-Indian Relations," India Quarterly (January-March 1954), 3-11.
- Bowles, Chester. "America and Russia in India," Foreign Affairs (July 1971), 635-51.
- Caroe, Olaf. "MYX," The Round Table. Vol. XXXIX. No. 154 (March 1949).
- Choudhury, G.W. "US Policy Towards the Subcontinent," Pacific Community (October 1973), 97-112.
- Dulles, John Foster. "Policy for Security and Peace," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 32, No. 3 (April 1954), 353-64.
- Harrison, Selig S. "India, Pakistan, and the United States," The New Republic (August 10, 1959), 10-17 (August 24, 1959), 20-25.
- Kennan, George F. "The Source of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (July 1947), 566-82; and (Sept. 7, 1959), 11-17.
- Kissinger, Henry. "Military Policy and Defense of the Grey Areas," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 3 (April 1955), 416-428.
- Masani, M.R. "India: Do's and Dont's for Americans," Foreign Affairs (April 1952), 412-25.
- P., "Middle Ground Between America and Russia--An Indian View," Foreign Affairs (January 1954), 259-69.

Palmer, Norman D. "India as a Factor in United States Foreign Policy," International Studies (July 1964), 49-68.

Roth, Andrew. "Jinnah's New Republic," The Nation, Vol. 165, No. 24 (December 13, 1947).

Sayeed, Khalid A. "Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Pakistani Fears and Interests," Asian Survey (March 1964).

Wilcox, Wayne. "American Policy Towards South Asia," Asian Affairs (June 1973), 129-39.

IV. Newspapers and Magazines

Dawn (Karachi)

Daily Compass (New York)

The Birmingham Post

The New Times (Moscow)

The New York Times

The New York Herald Tribune

The New York Daily Mirror

The Associated Press Reports

The New York World Telegram and Sun

The New York Times Magazine

The Christian Science Monitor

The U.S. News and World Report

The Hindu (Madras)

Link (Delhi)

The Times (London)

The Washington Post

The Post Intelligencer Seattle

Sunday Compass (New York)

Collier's

Look

The Hindustan Times (Delhi)

VITA AUCTORIS

NAME	Neil Saigal
BIRTHDATE	12th March 1959
EDUCATION	High School Diploma, Lacombe Composite High School, Lacombe, Alberta, Canada. Attended University of Alberta from 1976 to 1980. Received Bachelor of Arts in History. Attended University of Windsor from September 1980 to April 1982. Received Master of Arts in History in 1986.